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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court, having granted Mr. Osborne's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, has 
jurisdiction over the instant matter both under its original jurisdiction to grant extraordinary 
writs, Utah Code Annot. § 78-2-2(2) (Supp. 2001) and its appellate jurisdiction on certiorari 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-3 (Supp. 2001), and Rule 45, Utah R. App. Proc. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether Utah law, the Utah Constitution and the federal constitution require 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent, who has no contacts with Utah, prior to 
terminating his or her parental rights pursuant to an adoption. On certiorari of an original 
petition, this Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals, which this Court reviews 
for correction of error. 
This issue was raised in the Original Petition and Memorandum in support thereof in 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
2. Whether the so-called "status" exception applies to termination of parental 
rights proceedings incident to adoption. On certiorari of an original petition, this Court 
reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals, which this Court reviews for correction of 
error. 
This issue was raised in the Original Petition and Memorandum in support thereof in 
the Utah Court of Appeals, and in the Adoption Center of Choice's response thereto. 
3. Whether the failure to afford a nonresident putative father a meaningful 
opportunity to raise jurisdictional defenses violates both the Utah Constitution and the federal 
1 
constitution. 
This issue was raised in the Original Petition and Memorandum in support thereof in 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, regulations, or case law 
whose interpretation is determinative, are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in 
this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case deals with an issue of national scope: to what extent can the State extend 
its power to conduct and finalize adoptions under the due process clauses of the state and 
federal due process constitutions, and must it have personal jurisdiction over nonresident 
natural fathers in order to do so? Also, must it provide a meaningful and effective 
mechanism for natural fathers to raise a personal jurisdiction defense to such proceedings? 
A. Statement of Facts7 
Mr. Osborne is a North Carolina resident with no contacts with Utah. He entered into 
a relationship with Angela Baker in November of 2000, and in December, 2000, she became 
pregnant. Mr. Osborne resolved then to provide for the new child and regarded the new 
1
 The background facts stated herein are taken from Mr. Osborne's sworn petition 
filed on February 14, 2001 in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County under the 
Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-45c-101 to -318 (2001), unless otherwise noted. The procedural facts cite to 
exhibits originally submitted to the Court of Appeals, except for Exhibits 36-41, which 
postdate that record, Exhibit 42, which is provided for the Court's convenience. All of 
these exhibits are in the Petitioner's Appendix. The UCCJEA petition is Exhibit 1. 
o 
child, Ms. Baker and her son, D.J., as a family unit for which he was responsible. 
In January, 2001, Mr. Osborne bought a new home in Stanley, North Carolina. He 
moved into this home along with Ms. Baker and D.J. In February, 2001, Ms. Baker was 
instructed by her doctor to be on bed rest because her pregnancy was regarded by her 
physician as being high risk. She followed the doctor's instructions and continued to live in 
the home Mr. Osborne has purchased. 
In March, 2001, Ms. Baker's mother moved into the house. Mr. Osborne agreed to 
support her. Ms. Baker continued to live in Mr. Osborne's home through July, 2001. It was 
during this month that Ms. Baker first called an adoption agency called An Act of Love. Mr. 
Osborne discovered that she had made contact with the adoption agency and expressed his 
disapproval. Ms. Baker represented at that point that she would not place the baby for 
adoption and attributed her actions to the fact that her psychiatric medications were 
apparently not working properly. Later that night, she checked herself into the local mental 
health center uttering suicide threats. 
After Ms. Baker returned from the mental health center and moved back into the 
home, Mr. Osborne continued his work schedule. One day at work he was informed by a 
neighbor that Ms. Baker and her mother had moved out. Mr. Osborne contacted Ms. Baker's 
aunt, who informed him that she had flown to Utah where a doctor had induced labor and 
where she was about to place the baby for adoption. 
On August 6,2001, Ms. Baker called Mr. Osborne at work from Utah. She told him 
that she had borne a son and that she was coming home with the baby boy and D.J. On 
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August 7, 2001, she traveled back to North Carolina. The child was in Utah for one day. 
Upon returning, Ms. Baker went to her mother's home for one week. She then 
indicated that she wished to return to the residence Mr. Osbome had purchased. Mr. Osbome 
and his father moved Ms. Baker and her mother back into the home. 
From August to October, 2001, Ms. Baker, Mr. Osbome, D.J. and Ms. Baker's mother 
lived together in Mr. Osborne's home. Ms. Baker and Mr. Osbome had a number of 
conversations regarding the fact that the child did not bear Mr. Osborne's name. During this 
time, Ms. Baker would continue to have episodes of emotional or psychological distress. She 
would act out inappropriately and occasionally throw things. Mr. Osbome ascribed her 
conduct to her psychological condition. 
During this entire time, D.J., Ms. Baker's son, and the baby boy developed a bonding 
relationship. Also during the time between August and October, 2001, Mr. Osbome took 
over the responsibility of maintaining bookkeeping responsibilities for the family. Their 
financial situation thereafter started to improve. Mr. Osbome enlisted the help of his mother 
in order to balance the family books. 
In November and December, 2001, the financial situation of the family continued to 
improve. Ms. Baker would from time to time express dissatisfaction with not being in 
control of the books, but the financial situation was improving. D J. and the baby continued 
to develop a bonding relationship during this time. Thanksgiving 2001 was celebrated with 
Ms. Baker's family. Mr. Osbome cooked and prepared the Thanksgiving meal. This was at 
Ms. Baker's family's residence in Stanley, North Carolina. 
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In early December, 2001, in an effort to rectify the fact that the child was not named 
after Mr. Osborne, he twice secured a blank Affidavit for Voluntary Declaration of Paternity 
for execution under North Carolina law. Ms. Baker signed both of these documents but then 
became distressed and ripped the documents up. 
During the month of December, 2001, Mr. Osborne and Ms. Baker's relationship 
deteriorated. Even so, Mr. Osborne and Ms. Baker continued to cohabit in Mr. Osborne's 
home, and Mr. Osborne continued to provide for Ms. Baker, D.J. and the baby. In mid-
December of 2001, the relationship deteriorated to the point that Ms. Baker took D.J. and the 
baby and moved out of the house and took many of the possessions of both Ms. Baker and 
Mr. Osborne with her, including Mr. Osborne's tools of trade. Upon leaving, Ms. Baker also 
did damage to the house. 
On December 15,2001, Ms. Baker contacted Mr. Osborne's mother and asked if she 
could take the baby to the hospital for an ear infection and respiratory distress. She also 
indicated that she needed those items that she was accustomed to Mr. Osborne providing 
(diapers, gas drops, formula, etc.). Mr. Osbome complied with these requests. 
On December 28, 2001, Ms. Baker came to Mr. Osborne's home and picked up 
Christmas presents that had been purchased by Mr. Osborne for both D.J. and for the baby. 
December 28,2001, was the last time that Mr. Osbome has seen the baby. In early January, 
2002, he received a number of calls from Ms. Baker, care of his stepmother, Sandra Bridges, 
who took calls for Mr. Osborne. These messages demonstrate that Mr. Osborne was an 
active care giver and that he could not have known that Ms. Baker had surreptitiously 
traveled from Utah to North Carolina to pl^ce Kenneth for adoption until after she had 
relinquished him to the Adoption Center of Choice.2 Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 36 of the 
Appellant's Appendix. 
Upon discovering that Ms. Baker had placed Kenneth for adoption, Mr. Osborne 
called the Department of Social Services in Gastonia, North Carolina and spoke with Patricia 
L. Hovis. He also contacted The Adoption Center of Choice for information regarding the 
adoption and was given none. 
In his communication with The Adoption Center of Choice, Mr. Osborne was 
informed that the child had been placed with a set of adoptive parents located in the State of 
Utah. This communication confirmed further representations made by the natural mother, 
Ms. Baker. 
The agency and/or adoptive parents failed to secure the approval of the North Carolina 
or Utah administrator of the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children before the 
filing of the adoption petition in question. 
2Ms. Baker left the following messages: 
• Saturday, December 30, 2001, at 8:03 p.m. requesting clothes and diapers 
for Kenneth and saying she could talk about that the next day. 
• Thursday, January 3, 2002, at 9:34 PM, complaining about Mr. Osborne's 
request for his tools. 
• Tuesday, January 8, 2002, at 11:58 PM, indicating that the car was hers 
before she left for Utah. 
• Thursday, January 10, 2002, at 10:36 AM, indicating that Mr. Osborne 
cannot fight the state of Utah. 
Petitioner's Appendix Exhibit 36 and sound recording (part of the record in the 
Court of Appeals). 
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B. Statement of Proceedings Below 
On February 14,2002, Mr. Osborne filed a petition under the UCCJEA, challenging 
the subject matter jurisdiction of Utah courts over the adoption of his son, Kenneth Skyler 
Baker, and the termination of his parental rights through that adoption. In the petition, Mr. 
Osborne specifically disavowed seeking any substantive relief from the state court; he only 
challenged the court's subject matter jurisdiction. This challenge was predicated on the fact 
that neither Mr. Osborne nor the child were residents of the State of Utah, and that the child 
had been transported to Utah unlawfully. Exhibit 1. 
In his petition, Mr. Osborne alleged that the birth mother traveled to Utah to place 
Kenneth for the specific purpose of placing the child, all in violation of the Interstate 
Compact for the Placement of Children.3 Exhibit 1. 
Mr. Osborne did not attempt to collaterally attack the adoption now pending in the 
State of Utah. The petition was narrowly tailored under the UCCJEA to compel a 
jurisdictional self-examination by the court in which the petition was filed. Exhibit 1. 
Mr. Osborne filed along with his UCCJEA petition an Ex Parte Motion to Open 
Adoption File under Utah Code Annot. § 78-30-15, requesting that the court disclose the 
case number of the pending adoption proceeding, wherever in the state it might be, in order 
to identify the adoptive parents and to determine the status of the proceeding that had been 
occurring in derogation of his rights. Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 3. 
The District Court refused to issue such an order, but instructed the clerk of only the 
3Utah Code Annot. § 62A-4a-701 through -709 (2002). 
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Fourth Judicial District to search the court records for an adoption concerning Kenneth 
Skyler Baker III. The court stated that it did not have the power to compel clerks in other 
districts to conduct such a search, or to divulge the information requested. Exhibit 4. 
On February 19, 2002, Mr. Osborne filed a motion to reconsider (Exhibit 5), which 
was supported by a memorandum (Exhibit 6) and affidavit (Exhibit 7). The gravamen of the 
motion was that the court unreasonably restricted the scope of the search for information 
concerning the adoption case so as to render it meaningless. Accompanying these documents 
was a motion for order to show cause as to why the Adoption Center of Choice ("the 
agency") should not divulge the identifying information of the adoptive parents. Exhibit 8. 
The court denied the motion that same day, and suggested in its denial that Mr. 
Osborne subpoena the information from the agency. Minute entry (Exhibit 9). 
Mr. Osborne accepted the court's suggestion and served a subpoena upon the agency 
in order to secure the identities of the adoptive parents so that they might be served with a 
copy of the petition. The agency was not a named party in the petition. Exhibit 10. 
The agency filed a motion to quash. Exhibit 11 and Exhibit 12. Mr. Osbome 
responded in a hearing convened two days after the agency's response was filed. Exhibit 13. 
Mr. Osborne also filed a supplemental memorandum, which advised the court of a recent 
ruling concerning the limits of personal jurisdiction. That supplemental memorandum 
expressly stated that Mr. Osbome did not at that point raise a personal jurisdiction challenge, 
but that the court should be aware of the limits of personal jurisdiction and how those limits 
favored Mr. Osborne's chances of prevailing. Exhibit 14. The agency filed a response, 
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(Exhibit 15), and Mr. Osborne replied (Exhibit 16). 
The court ultimately granted the motion to quash. It stated (Exhibit 17) that the 
UCC JEA did not apply, and further opined that plaintiffs claims would be barred under the 
Utah Adoption Code were he to challenge the adoption. 
Mr. Osborne never raised the adoption code in his petition, but rather, in the course 
of attempting to quash the subpoena, the defendant Adoption Center of Choice raised the 
adoption code as a defense. Mr. Osborne never responded to the Adoption Center's 
challenge to plaintiffs legal rights under the adoption code, it being his consistent contention 
that an inquiry into the code's application to him was irrelevant. The Fourth Judicial District 
Court for Utah County issued dicta in the memorandum decision regarding the adoption 
code, dicta that clearly exceeded the narrow scope of Mr. Osborne's UCC JEA petition. 
Furthermore, the court's ruling was not final, but was an interim ruling regarding a motion 
to quash a subpoena served on a nonparty. 
Because the UCCJEA petition was never served on a party, Mr. Osborne dismissed 
it under rule 41 on March 27, 2002. Exhibit 18. The court subsequently signed an order 
quashing the subpoena on April 4, 2002, the last action occurring in the case. Exhibit 19. 
On March 8, 2002, the Adoption Center of Choice filed a Petition for Determination 
of Birth Father's Rights with the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, case no. 
022400054. Exhibit 20. 
Counsel for the Adoption Center sent a letter on March 11,2002, to Phillip E. Lowry, 
counsel to Mr. Osborne in his UCCJEA petition. The letter requested that Mr. Lowry accept 
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service on behalf of Mr. Osborne. The letter also stated that if service were not accepted "I 
will arrange for [Mr. Osborne] to receive notice." Exhibit 21. 
Mr. Lowry refused to accept service and indicated to the Adoption Center in a letter 
dated March 15,2002, that it would have to serve Mr. Osborne personally with the petition, 
but that Mr. Lowry did not believe that this was even possible given that Mr. Osborne was 
a North Carolina resident. Exhibit 22. 
Accompanying the petition filed by the Adoption Center of Choice was a Notice of 
Petition for Determination of Birth Father's Rights. This notice was directed to Frank 
Osborne care of Phillip Lowry, Esq. Exhibit 23. 
No proof of service regarding the petition for determination of birth father's rights has 
ever been copied to Mr. Lowry, nor has any service been attempted upon Mr. Osborne in 
North Carolina of any court documents, including the Adoption Petition or the Petition for 
Determination of Birth Father's Rights. 
On March 21, 2002, three days after the Memorandum Decision in the UCCJEA 
action, the agency filed with the Fourth Judicial District Court in case 022400054, a Motion 
to Allow Petition for Determination of Birth Father's Rights to Be Heard Without Notice. 
Filed on the same day was a Notice to Submit the said motion. Exhibit 24, Exhibit 25, and 
Exhibit 26. 
The same day, March 21, 2002, the agency filed a Motion to Grant Petition for 
Determination of Birth Father's Rights., Once again, the agency contemporaneously filed a 
Notice to Submit this motion. Exhibit 27 and Exhibit 28. 
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Neither of the motions nor notices to submit were copied to either Mr. Osborne or his 
counsel, as reflected in the mailing certificates attached thereto. 
Six days later, on March 27,2002, without having received any input whatsoever from 
Mr. Osborne, the Fourth Judicial District Court issued a memorandum decision in case 
022400054, in which he granted the agency's motion to have the pending petition heard ex 
parte. Exhibit 29. This memorandum decision was not sent to Mr. Osborne or his counsel. 
On April 8, 2002, the court executed in case 022400054 an Order Granting Motion 
to Allow Petition for Determination of Birth Father's Rights to Be Heard without Notice, 
which was an order of memorializing the findings and conclusions made in the memorandum 
decision regarding the ex parte nature of the proceedings. A copy of this order is attached 
as Exhibit 30. The next day, on April 9, 2002, the court issued an Order regarding Birth 
Father's Rights, which declared affirmatively that Mr. Osborne had no rights with respect 
to the pending Utah adoption. Exhibit 31. 
Neither of these orders were sent to Mr. Osborne or his counsel. Indeed, after the 
agency requested Mr. Osborne's counsel to accept service, it communicated no further with 
either Mr. Osborne's counsel regarding the petition. Mr. Osborne and his counsel therefore 
rightfully assumed that the agency was taking no further action on the matter. This proved 
untrue, as the agency had filed an ex parte application, which was granted by the court, and 
which unilaterally terminated Mr. Osborne's rights with no notice to him. 
On April 4,2002, Mr. Osborne filed with the Utah federal court an action challenging 
the constitutionality of Utah's construction of the Utah adoption code. Exhibit 32. 
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Mr. Osborne's counsel first received notice of the April 8, 2002, order in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court of Utah (the one that allowed determination of his parental rights ex 
parte) when he received a copy of it in the mail on June 10, 2002. It was attached to the 
agency's motion for summary judgment in the federal judicial proceeding. Exhibit 33. 
On June 21,2002, Mr. Osborne filed a petition for extraordinary relief with the Utah 
Court of Appeals, requesting that the court stay the adoption, reveal its location, and for a 
declaration that he might intervene in the adoption without waiving his personal jurisdiction 
defense. The Petition is attached hereto. 
On June 28, 2002, Mr. Osborne submitted the affidavit of his stepmother, Sandra 
Bridges, to the Court of Appeals to supplement the record therein. The affidavit was 
accompanied by a compact disc of a message machine recording and a transcript thereof. 
The recordings demonstrate that Mr. Osborne could not have know about the placement of 
Kenneth in Utah until after relinquishment had occurred. Exhibit 36. 
On July 1,2002, the General Court of Justice, District Court Division, Gaston County, 
North Carolina, issued a Temporary Restraining Order in Frank Osborne v. Angela Catherine 
Baker, Adoption Center of Choice, Inc, John Doe and Jane Doe, case no. 02 CvD 478, 
restraining the adoptive parents or the agency from proceeding with the adoption. This was 
originally attached to the Application for Extraordinary Relief filed with this Court on July 
3,2002. Exhibit 37. 
On July 2, 2002, the Court of Appeals, in a written opinion, denied the petition for 
extraordinary relief. It reasoned that the mother's 24-hour stay in Utah placed Mr. Osbome 
i? 
on notice that he should comply with Utah law. Thus, he forfeited any right to notice or 
consent, and personal jurisdiction over him was not required. The Court of Appeals opinion 
is attached hereto in the Appendix to the Brief. 
On July 3,2002, this Court granted an emergency stay on the adoption, and has now 
converted that stay into a preliminary stay pending disposition. 
On July 12,2002, Mr. Osborne's counsel secured the identity of the adoptive parents 
and served them under Rule 4 of a Notice of Proceedings. Copies of these notices, along 
with a return of service, are contained in the Supplemental Appendix as Exhibits 38 and 39. 
Mr. Osborne's counsel advised the Court of this development. Exhibit 40. The Court has 
since amended its caption accordingly. 
On August 13, 2002, Mr. Osborne submitted to this Court a copy of a Preliminary 
Injunction in the matter of Frank Osborne v. Angela Catherine Baker, Adoption Center of 
Choice, Inc, John Doe and Jane Doe, case no. 02 CvD 478, along with a letter from the 
Adoption Center filed with that court protesting the issuance of an injunction. Exhibit 41. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the 1990s, approximately 120,000 adoptions took place each year.4 The vast 
majority of these were unproblematic. Some, however, were conducted in derogation of 
rights of natural fathers, with the drastic consequence that family units established on the 
backs of these fathers were, regrettably but appropriately, broken apart. 
4Jeanette Mills, Unwed Birthfathers and Infant Adoption: Balancing a Father's 
Rights with the States Need for a Timely Surrender Process, 62 La. L. Rev. 615, 615 & 
n.4 (2002). 
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In the midst of these highly publicized cases and reeling from this Court's criticism 
and invalidation of portions of the then-applicable Utah Adoption Code, the Utah legislature 
enacted one of the most aggressive Adoption Codes in the country with respect to the natural 
father's responsibility to preserve and protect his rights. It did so without considering the due 
process violations this legislation could inflict on non-Utah fathers whose children are 
spirited into this state unlawfully (and, derivatively, the hardship wrought on adoptive parents 
whose efforts would be dashed if an adoption were invalidated because of constitutional 
violations). 
The Adoption Code utterly fails to consider the non-Utah father who has no contacts 
with the State of Utah. It purports to apply itself to any father whose child happens to be 
placed for adoption in Utah, but contains no predicate for doing so. This is a violation of the 
due process, which guarantees that citizens of one state are protected from being haled into 
court in another state absent some contact with the first state. These requirements are not 
modified or suspended merely because a child is involved. 
Of further concern is that such natural fathers, being in the position to have to 
affirmatively rebut a violation of their rights, are placed in jeopardy of waiving any challenge 
to personal jurisdiction if they raise such a challenge in a Utah court. Not only is this a 
further violation of the federal due process clause, but it also violates the due process and 
open courts provisions of the Utah Constitution. 
Mr. Osborne has suffered directly as a result of the Code's deficiencies. He developed 
a substantial relationship with Kenneth, providing of the birth mother before Kenneth was 
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born and holding Kenneth out as his own child, in his home, and providing for him, for the 
first five months of Kenneth's life. His substantial and profound relationship with Kenneth 
only exacerbates the due process jurisdictional violations he has suffered, and underscores 
the unfairness of expecting all fathers, especially those who are not "deadbeat" or "scofflaw," 
from having to come to Utah not only claim their children, but to prove to a Utah court that 
they have the right to do so. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH HAS NO PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER MR. OSBORNE, AND 
THEREFORE CANNOT EXERCISE AUTHORITY OVER HIM OR APPLY ITS 
ADOPTION LAW TO HIM. 
A. Utah Must Have Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Natural Fathers in 
Adoption Proceedings 
Adoption amounts to a termination proceeding,5 yet none of the procedural safeguards 
attendant to termination are codified in the Utah Adoption Code, nor are generally 
recognized as even being applicable to adoption. This is because adoption is generally 
regarded as collusive, consent being required of the natural parent involved. Natural fathers 
of children born out of wedlock ("putative fathers") are different, however. Traditionally, 
their consents were not required at all. United States Supreme Court cases changed this view 
5
"It is common, in considering adoption, to focus attention on . . . the formation of 
the legal bond with the adoptive parents, but since in our legal system it is generally the 
case that the parent-child relationship may exist with only one set of parents at a time, 
adoption also necessarily involves the termination of the bond with the natural parents. 
In some jurisdictions the two steps are accomplished by two separate lawsuits, the first 
being referred to as a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the second as 
adoption." Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States § 
20.1 at 850 (1988) (emphasis supplied). 
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in the 1970s and 80s, however, affording putative fathers certain constitutional protections, 
including the right to give consent for (or, alternatively, to veto) adoptions of their children.6 
The outer limit to putative fathers' rights in adoptions was set in Lehr v. Robertson.7 
In Lehr the Supreme Court stated that the physical role of being a father did not amount to 
fatherhood. The latter, not the former, status was protected by the Constitution. Lehr placed 
the burden of proving fatherhood on the putative father by doing acts consistent with 
fatherhood. It also sanctioned legislatures' mandating what those acts should be, within 
reasonable limits. The New York law at issue in Lehr stated that one of those acts should be 
registering with a statewide registry of putative fathers. 
Lehr allows state legislatures to presume that putative fathers have not demonstrated 
fatherhood, with the putative father being allowed to rebut that presumption.8 In Utah, the 
putative father of a child less than six months old must initiate a paternity action, file a notice 
of doing so, register with a putative birth father registry, and render support to the mother 
prenatally and to the child postnatally to rebut the legislative presumption that he has not 
^Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972)(law recognizes family relations, 
even when the parents are not married; "the private interest... of a man in the children 
he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful 
countervailing interest, protection."); Cuban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382-83 
(1979)(court strikes on equal protection grounds statute requiring natural mother's, but 
not natural father's, consent to adoption). 
7463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983). 
8This echoes the notion, argued below, that the statute acts like a plaintiff, reaching 
out and grabbing natural fathers, who are then required to adopt a defense posture. 
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demonstrated fatherhood.9 All of these things must be done before the natural mother 
relinquishes custody of the child. 
When the Lehr court deferred to the New York legislature, it continued a long-
standing doctrine allowing states to regulate issues of domestic law, including placement of 
children for adoption. Citation. Adoption law is accordingly balkanized, much as is tort law 
and other areas of the law traditionally relegated to the states.l0 This is a recognition of state 
sovereignty and the fact that the Constitution reserved such powers to the states. 
Extending from this notion of state sovereignty is the notion that states have limits on 
their jurisdiction and the reach of their laws under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. While on its face such limits appear to restrict exercise of a state's raw power, 
they in fact protect state sovereignty by preventing one state from treading on the domain of 
another. As noted in Hanson v. Denckla, the requirements for personal jurisdiction "are more 
than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence 
of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States."11 
Limits on state jurisdiction were at one time based almost exclusively on territoriality: 
the state could exercise jurisdiction over whosoever or whatsoever was within its borders.12 
9Utah Code Annot.§ 78-30-4.14 (2002). 
10For a summary of state laws, see Karen C. Wehner, Daddy Wants Rights Too: a 
Perspective on Adoption Statutes, 31 Hous. L. Rev. 690, 705-12 (1994); 1 ADOPTION 
LAW AND PRACTICE (Joan H. Hollinger ed., 2002) Appendix 1-A (summary of all 50 
states' major adoption provisions). 
u357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958). 
nPennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
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From this doctrine came hard cases that bore odd and rigid concepts and classifications. 
Tiring of the odd constructs needed to patch the patch over the hole, the Supreme 
Court adopted a jurisdictional construct based on fairness and contact with the forum: "Due 
process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be 
not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such 
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice."13 Later, in Shaffer v, Heitner14, the court clarified that all jurisdictional inquiries 
were to be assessed with the International Shoe criteria. Further clarifying those criteria, in 
1985 the Court stated that minimum contact was not enough. A court must go on to evaluate 
whether the nature and quality of the contacts make it "fair play and substantial justice" to 
subject the defendant to jurisdiction there.15 The Court listed factors to be considered in 
applying this last test, including plaintiffs interest, the statefs substantive policies, and 
efficient administration of justice.16 
From the other perspective, the Court stated it is insufficient that the requirements of 
fair play and substantial justice are satisfied. The Court has held that minimum contacts 
between the defendant and the forum are required even if the burden on the defendant was 
"International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (l945)(quoting Milliken 
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
14433U.S. 186(1977). 
"Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985). 
]6Id. at 476-77. 
1 O 
minimal, and thus fairness and substantial justice were met.17 
The limits on state sovereignty imposed by the Due Process clause collide with the 
Lehr presumption against fatherhood in the cases of putative fathers whose children are 
transported from the putative father's state to another state and placed for adoption there. 
While a putative father can be deemed to be on notice of the burden placed upon him by his 
own state to rebut the Lehr presumption, he cannot be presumed to be on notice of the 
requirements of every state to do so. Indeed, those requirements vary wildly.18 In Mr. 
Osborne's case, the fact that he had Kenneth in his home and cared for him for five months 
means that his consent under North Carolina law is required for an adoption to take 
place-why should he preoccupy himself that some other state may disregard his veto right? 
State control of how to rebut the Lehr presumption breaks down in the case of 
interstate placements. While the presumption may exist nationwide, the state law 
requirements to rebut the presumption are hostage to the due process clause's personal 
jurisdiction requirements. In other words, a putative father is required to rebut the Lehr 
presumption only in a state that can exercise personal jurisdiction over him. 
This makes sense. One invokes the Lehr presumption for a limited purpose: to 
determine whether a putative father is entitled to notice and/or consent in an adoption 
xlWorld-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980)(contacts 
cannot be fortuitous, and purposeful contact must be present even if the assertion of 
jurisdiction meets the fairness test). The Court again separated these tests in Asahi Metal 
Ind. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102, 108, 113 (1987). 
18
 See, e.g. Joan H. Hollinger, Adoption Procedure, in 1 ADOPTION LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 4.01 (Hollinger ed., 2002). 
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proceeding. One does not invoke it to determine whether a state has jurisdiction over a 
putative father, or whether a state's law applies to a putative father. Whether a man has 
demonstrated fatherhood has nothing to do with a sovereign's control over his person. To 
say otherwise inflates the Lehr presumption (there is no fatherhood relationship) to a larger 
presumption that only local law may be used by the putative father to rebut the presumption. 
As noted above, state sovereignty and due process limitations allow the putative father to 
choose his mode of rebuttal consistent with his minimum contacts and notions of fair play 
and substantial justice. Lehr does not change this equation; it merely creates the 
presumption, not the mode of rebuttal. 
\Lehr 
Putative fathers are presumed not to have 
shown "fatherhood" unless they grasp the 
opportunity to do so (by rebutting this 
presumption) 
International Shoe et al. 1 
The sovereign states have the right to i 
define the ways putative fathers may rebut 1 
the Lehr fatherhood presumption within 1 
the confines of due process (minimum I 
contacts, fair play and substantial justice) 1 
Lehr allows a nonfatherhood presumption, but that presumption only predicates 
whether notices and consents are required; it is not a predicate for jurisdiction, that is, 
application of the very laws that provide for such consents and notices. Jurisdiction is the 
substrate over which the law lies-the mode of rebutting the Lehr presumption can only 
operate after that substrate has cured and hardened, that is, after the state desiring to apply 
its law has found a reason other than the putative father's status qua putative father to 
exercise jurisdiction over him. The Lehr presumption is not a substitute for jurisdiction. 
This view comports with applicable Supreme Court precedent, including the child 
on 
custody case of May v. Anderson}9 Generally, it is impossible to give a child custody decree 
full faith and credit because of its open and modifiable nature. Contemporary legislation, 
such as the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA)20 and its 
predecessor, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA),21 have attempted to 
address this problem through a uniform process wherein the several states agree to give 
custody determinations full faith and credit, with the approval of Congress in the form of 
federal legislation (the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act22). 
None of this legislation, however, addresses the thorny issue of how a state can issue 
a custody decree without first obtaining personal jurisdiction over the affected parties.23 May 
took this issue head-on and concluded definitively that a custody decree entered without 
personal jurisdiction over one of the parties could not be granted full faith and credit, 
inasmuch as the issuance of the decree violated due process. 
The May court analogized its decision to alimony decisions in which personal 
jurisdiction is required in order to make decisions regarding property allocation. The court 
reasoned that if personal jurisdiction is required in such cases, clearly when the far more 
19345 U.S. 528(1953). 
20Codified at Utah Code Annot. §§ 78-45c-101 to -318 (2001). 
21Formerly codified at Utah Code Annot. §§ 78-45c-l to -26 (1996). 
2228 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. 2001). 
23The UCCJEA brazenly states, "Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction 
over, a party or a child is neither necessary nor sufficient to make a child custody 
determination." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-201(3) (2001). Thus, subject matter 
jurisdiction is both a necessary and sufficient condition for personal jurisdiction under 
this law. 
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weighty right of custody is adjudicated, personal jurisdiction is similarly required: "Rights 
far more precious to appellant than property rights will be cut off if she is to be bound by the 
Wisconsin award of custody."24 
Dovetailing with May is Kulko v. Superior Court P The Court announced in Kulko 
that even when the state has an interest in a child domiciled and present within it, the state's 
sovereign interest does not permit it to assert jurisdiction in a support action over a parent 
who lacks minimum contacts with the state. In Kulko a New York father was found to have 
insufficient contacts with the state of California even though he had willingly sent his 
children there to live with their mother (his ex-wife). The United States Supreme Court 
reversed the California Supreme Court, which had stated that the father's sending his 
daughter to California had an "effect" in California by which he had purposely avails himself 
of the benefits of the forum. 
The court stated that the mere act of sending the first child to California connoted 
neither an intent to obtain or expectation to receive a corresponding benefit in that state. The 
father's action had not been purposeful and volitional, but rather constituted mere 
acquiescence in the event that had invoked the protection of the forum's law. Furthermore, 
the cause of action arose not from the father's commercial transactions in interstate 
commerce but rather from his personal, domestic relations. Furthermore, the father did not 
purposely derive any financial benefit from the children's move to California. The court 
3^45 U.S. at 533. 
;436 U.S. 84(1977) 
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concluded 
this single act [of allowing the first child to live with the mother] is surely not 
one that are reasonable parent would expect to result in the substantial 
financial burden and personal strain of litigating a child support sued in a 
forum 3000 miles away, and we therefor seen no basis on which I can be said 
that appellant could reasonably have anticipated been " haled before [a 
California] court.26 
The court also stated that any other approach to the problem would deter parents from 
cooperating in custody arrangements that were in the best interests of the children. 
Accordingly, the substantive policies underlying the action required that the courts find 
clearly purposeful conduct on the part of the father before asserting jurisdiction. The court 
emphasized that the state's interest, although substantial and legitimate, did not make 
California a fair forum.27 
B. The Utah Long-Arm Statute Does Not Allow Utah to Exercise Jurisdiction over 
Mr. Osborne 
Utah law reflects the federal standards. It imposes a two-part test to determine 
whether a Utah court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident.28 First, the claim 
against the nonresident must arise from activities enumerated in the Utah long-arm statute.29 
Second, if the alleged acts come within the long-arm statute's reach, the nonresident 
defendant's contacts must comport with the due process standards enumerated by 
26436 U.S. at 97. 
27436 U.S. at 93, 101. 
^Anderson v. American Soc'y of Plastic & Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 
826 (Utah 1990). 
29Id. at 826. 
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International Shoe and its progeny. 
There is no question that Mr. Osborne' s actions do not fall within the long-arm statute. 
The only sections remotely applicable to him are subsections (3) and (6), which state that 
a nonresident submits himself to the jurisdiction of a Utah court when his of her purposeful 
conduct gives raise to a claim of "tortious" conduct or "with respect for divorce, separate 
maintenance, or child support... ."30 Apart from the fact that the statute completely omits 
any reference to termination or adoption proceedings,31 Mr. Osborne had absolutely no 
contact with Utah of any kind at the time Kenneth was placed for adoption. There is no 
"purposeful" conduct that can act as predicate for the act to apply. 
C. Utah Has No Basis to Exercise Personal Jurisdiction Over Mr. Osborne. 
Nor are there minimum contacts sufficient to justify any exercise of jurisdiction. This 
discussion is necessarily short because of the complete lack of contacts whatsoever between 
Mr. Osborne and Utah. Kenneth was kidnaped by his mother and brought here. There is not 
even an acquiescence argument under such facts (as if such an argument would do any good 
30Utah Code Annot.§§ 78-27-24(3) and (6) (Supp. 2000). 
31The agency may argue that the Adoption Code, Utah Code Annot. §§ 78-30-1 
through-19 (Supp. 2001), reflects the intent of the legislature to include nonresident 
putative fathers within the scope of the long-arm statute, but nowhere in that Code is 
there a jurisdictional statement to that effect. The legislature may have just assumed that 
jurisdiction would be possible or proper, but this assumption amounts to little more than 
an oversight. Because adoption amounts to a termination of parental rights proceeding, 
this conclusion is supported by In re W.A., 2002 UT 72, (App.), cert, granted 48 P.3d 979 
(2002)(holding that long-arm statute did not apply to termination proceedings). The 
agency is further judicially estopped from arguing that the UCCJEA contains a basis for 
expanding the reach of the long-arm statute, since it argued in Mr. Osborne's UCCJEA 
proceeding (successfully) that the UCCJEA does not apply to adoptions. 
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under Kulko). Chromosome jurisdiction is not a recognized judicial doctrine. 
Given this lack of contacts, an analysis of fairness or purposeful availment becomes 
moot. Even if Kenneth's presence in the state were sufficient to be a "contact", imposing 
jurisdiction on Mr. Osborne on this basis would be fundamentally unfair. It is simply beyond 
question that Mr. Osborne could not reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Utah to 
defend his parental rights. 
The Court of Appeals' entire opinion is born on the back of one slender reed: Kenneth 
was born here, so Mr. Osborne was bound to comply with Utah law. Thus, "chromosome 
jurisdiction" was the basis of a purposeful availment and minimum contacts. Not that the 
Court of Appeals ever articulated such reasoning: it must be inferred. Implicit or express, 
the reasoning is flawed. Kenneth having been born here and present here for 24 hours simply 
is not the basis for personal jurisdiction over Mr. Osborne. 
The Court of Appeals also erred in characterizing jurisdiction as simply a defendant's 
concern. It ignored the fact that the adoption code acts as a plaintiff, forcing putative fathers 
into a defense posture. It also ignored the ex parte proceedings in which Mr. Osborne was 
indeed a defendant. Thus, its entire analysis collapses as the slender reed inevitably breaks. 
D. Mr. Osborne Did Not Waive His Personal Jurisdiction Defense by Challenging 
Utah's Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Has Not Been Afforded a Meaningful Opportunity 
to Raise a Personal Jurisdiction Defense. 
The agency's arguments below require more attention than the reasoning of the Court 
of Appeals, whose treatment of the matter is so cursory so as to merit no further analysis. 
The agency has argued that Mr. Osborne has the required contacts with and availment of 
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Utah law to justify Utah's jurisdiction over him (and, a fortiori, application of Utah law to 
him). It claims that when he filed a petition under the UCCJEA to challenge Utah's exercise 
of subject matter jurisdiction over him, he waived any personal jurisdiction defense.32 
The agency's reasoning is fundamentally flawed: 
1. While it is well-established law that a personal jurisdiction defense is inconsistent 
with seeking substantive relief, challenging subject matter jurisdiction (that is, 
challenging the court's raw power to act) is not a prayer for substantive relief. Rather, 
it is a challenge to the court's very authority, not a simple invocation of that authority. 
2. Mr. Osborne reserved in his UCCJEA petition his right to raise in the future a 
personal jurisdiction defense. He thus preserved a narrow jurisdictional challenge 
within a more broad one. 
3. The UCCJEA action was dismissed without prejudice, and is of no force and effect. 
This is because the court refused to allow Mr. Osborne to serve the defendants. 
The agency has also cited In re B.B.D.,33 in contending that any appearance in a Utah 
court to either directly or collaterally attack an adoption, no matter how narrowly tailored that 
appearance may be, is a purposeful availment under International Shoe. 
But B.B.D. is distinguishable. B.B.D. dealt with a Washington father who challenged 
Utah's jurisdiction over him in an adoption. He also raised a variety of substantive theories. 
In making its decision, this Court relied on three previous Utah decisions, along with 
32Mr. Osborne must reemphasize that this appeal is not and cannot be from that 
proceeding, since he was prohibited from even serving the defendants therein. 
33984P.2d 967 (Utah 1999). 
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decisions from Illinois, Indiana, and New York. All of these cases dealt with the UCCJA 
(whose successor, the UCCJEA, does not even apply to adoptions), and did not take into 
account that adoption is both a custody proceeding and a termination proceeding. 
The fact that adoption contemplates termination of parental rights distinguishes 
adoption cases from garden-variety custody cases, such as those cited by B.B.D. Termination 
of parental rights is irrevocable and is an affirmative act of legal violence to a person's 
bundle of liberty interests. In Swayne v. LDS Social Services?* the court recognized that the 
termination of parental rights effected by the Utah adoption code did not require a plaintiff, 
but rather was "self-operative." The code itself acts like a plaintiff, and reaches out and 
grabs natural fathers, who are in reality defendants, but have no knowledge of the 
proceedings being taken against them. Both the Utah and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
have mechanisms under rule 12 to allow persons to object to improper extraterritorial 
exercise of personal jurisdiction. B.B.D. did not extend those mechanisms to the putative 
father. It did not create a method by which a defendant/father may challenge the application 
of Utah law to him without waiving the very challenge that he is bringing. 
Here, however, Mr. Osborne has not raised any substantive challenge to the 
adoption-he has limited himself to jurisdictional challenges only. As such, B.B.D. need not 
apply at all. With all due respect to this Court, the Court could have ended its discussion in 
B.B.D^by citing the father's reliance on substantive theories in addition to his jurisdictional 
ones. But the Court pushed forward, and instead engaged in an analysis of how purposeful 
34670 F. Supp.1537 (D. Utah 1987). 
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availment was the predicate for jurisdiction. In that analysis the Court failed to distinguish 
which of the father's myriad arguments constituted a purposeful availment. Surely the 
jurisdictional arguments did not constitute an availment-only the substantive arguments 
could have done so. But the Court did not make this crucial (and constitutionally necessary) 
distinction. Because of this failure, the Court should now clarify what constitutes a 
purposeful availment, and why Mr. Osborne's jurisdictional challenges cannot constitute 
purposeful availment. Thus, this Court can easily distinguish B.B.D. as a case in which one 
has waived the personal jurisdiction argument by raising substantive issues, without going 
to the issue of whether B.B.D. needs to be overruled on constitutional grounds. 
Mr. Osborne has argued that he has proceeded in Utah only narrowly, indeed, as 
noted, as a "defendant" appearing specially. This argument may be academic, inasmuch as 
the same Fourth District Judge overseeing the UCCJEA petition purported to terminate Mr. 
Osborne's parental rights in an ex parte proceeding. The adoption agency could have 
attempted service on Mr. Osborne in North Carolina with a constable or sheriff, and then he 
could have made a proper special appearance under Utah rules. They did not do this, and this 
was deliberate. Mr. Osborne was specifically a party defendant to the ex parte action 
purporting to terminate his rights. 
Under the Court of Appeals' reading of B.B.D., the only remaining option available 
to Mr. Osborne would be to raise his constitutional objections to the Utah courts' exercise 
of personal jurisdiction over him in a collateral attack on the adoption. However, if Mr. 
Osborne were to petition for this, he would waive any argument that the Utah courts lack 
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personal jurisdiction over him. This is a classic Catch-22, and it is not constitutional. Absent 
other contacts, exercise of jurisdiction over a natural father in this manner is simply 
unconstitutional.35 
E. Criticism and Fracture in the Arena of Personal Jurisdiction in Termination 
Proceedings: Above the Fog, May v. Anderson is Still Good Law 
Realizing the inherent weakness of trying to attribute some kind of minimum contacts 
to Mr. Osborne with the State of Utah, the agency has argued that one can escape the 
reasoning of May and the minimum contacts/fairness test, by treating the presence of the 
child in a jurisdiction as a predicate for "status" jurisdiction. This position echoes that of 
a number of scholars and promulgators of uniform acts governing custody and both 
Restatements of Conflicts. They advocate that notwithstanding International Shoe and its 
progeny, a state retains the ability to adjudicate the status of individuals residing in it, 
including the status of children placed for adoption (and also those concerned with the child's 
welfare, including natural fathers). This is a conceptually tidy concept were it not that often 
such status adjudications have adverse impacts on others whose rights are of constitutional 
magnititude. Ultimately, the status exception cannot constitutionally apply to adoptions and 
the termination of putative fathers' rights attendant to adoption. 
35Moreover, in a challenge to personal jurisdiction the burden of proof shifts quite 
readily to the agency. The agency, as the true "plaintiff in this matter, may take solace 
that the allegations in its pleading may be accepted as true, but only to the degree they are 
not rebutted by sworn testimony of the "defendant," in this case, Mr. Osborne. American 
Land Program, Inc. v. Bonaventura Uitgevers Maatschappi, Inc., 710 F.2d 1449, 1454 
(10th Cir. 1983). Mr. Osborne has submitted detailed verified pleadings in the record 
specifying his lack of purposeful availment of the Utah forum, and thus the agency has 
failed to meet its burden of proof. 
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F. The Status Doctrine as an Independent Basis for Jurisdiction in 
Termination/Adoption 
As noted, original concepts of jurisdiction articulated in Pennoyer v. Neff were based 
on the raw power of the sovereign state to exercise control of those within its border. This 
notion of "territoriality" was not entirely disposed of with the advent of International Shoe. 
In one of its progeny, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Court declared that the 
International Shoe standard should apply to the assertion of all forms of jurisdiction, thus 
dispensing with the Pennoyer "artificial" categories of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction. 
The Court dropped a footnote to this whitewashing, however, stating, "We do not suggest 
that jurisdictional doctrines other than those discussed in text, such as the particularized rules 
governing adjudications of status, are inconsistent with the standard of fairness. See, e.g., 
[Roger J. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Texas L. Rev. 657, 660-
661(1959)]."36 
From this footnote has arisen much mischief. A variety of commentators, most 
notably Brigitte Bodenheimer (one of the principal drafters of the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)), have argued that this footnote allows states to adjudicate the 
"status" of children within its borders in custody, adoption, and termination proceedings.37 
36Such status determinations are typified by divorce proceedings, in which no 
personal jurisdiction is required over a defendant spouse to terminate a marriage. As 
discussed below, it is an impermissible stretch to extend the status doctrine from divorce 
(which impacts no fundamental liberty interest whatsoever) to the termination of parental 
rights proceedings that are part of an adoption. 
37See, e.g., Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: 
A legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1207 
(1969); Brigitte Bodenheimer & Janet Neeley-Kvarme, Jurisdiction over Child Custody 
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A variety of reasons are forwarded for this conclusion, the most forceful of which is 
pragmatic: requiring personal jurisdiction over putative fathers would unhinge many 
adoptions, and in other custody proceedings would eviscerate the UCCJA and its successor, 
the UCCJEA. 
How do these arguments skirt May? Bodenheimer, in her original article on child 
custody jurisdiction, argued that a child's residence in the forum was a significant contact 
with the defendant parent that established jurisdiction over the defendant parent. Kulko 
eliminated this rationale. In response, and in casting for another way around pesky May, 
Bodenheimer and Janet Neeley-Kvarme pointed to Frankfurter's opinion in May and the 
Restatement's adoption of that opinion as dispositive. They reasoned that jurisdiction over 
the defendant parent in a custody case was an issue of comity. Under Frankfurter's 
concurrence in May, states are free to recognize sister state judgments. In enacting the 
Uniform Act, they argue, the states decided to recognize orders that complied with the Act, 
resolving the comity issue. 
G. Why the Status Doctrine Cannot be Reconciled with Applicable Law 
Notwithstanding the academic criticism of May and the fact that both the 
UCCJA/UCCJEA and Restatement of Conflicts have chosen to ignore it, scholars and cases 
are not unified in its criticism. A number of cases have required traditional personal 
jurisdiction over parents in termination and custody proceedings (including a Utah case),38 
and Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 229 (1979). 
}SSee, e.g., DeMent v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Court, 874 F.2d 510 (8th Cir. 1989); 
Application of Defender, 435 N.W.2d 717, 720-21 (S.D. 1989); see also In re W.A., 2002 
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and commentators are balkanized in their view of May and its effects. 
An incisive critical analysis of May and of the status exception in custody and 
termination proceedings is that of Rhonda Wasserman. She states six defective rationales 
for why the status or physical presence doctrines are invoked as jurisdictional predicates: 
1. The State Sovereignty Rationale. This rationale purports to defer to a state's right 
to adjudicate the rights of those within it, but is problematic because "custody proceedings 
often interfere with the sovereignty of other states, which have like interests in the same 
children."39 Furthermore, "the Supreme Court has made clear that constitutional limits on 
personal jurisdiction are designed to protect individuals' liberty interests, not to preserve state 
sovereignty and interstate federalism."40 Wasserman also notes that neither Shaffer nor Kulko 
vested the states therein with jurisdiction notwithstanding the presence of property or a child 
UT 72 \ 25 (App. 2002)("Recognizing the fundamental liberty interest at stake in a 
proceedings involving the termination of parental rights, other jurisdictions have held that 
a state must meet its Fourteenth Amendment obligation to obtain personal jurisdiction 
over a parent prior to attempting to terminate his or her parental rights. See In re One 
Minor Child, 411 A.2d 951, 952-53 (Del. 1980) (holding no jurisdiction over appellant 
because of insufficient notice); In re R.G., 611 So. 2d 71 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992) (per 
curiam); In re Doe, 83 Haw. 367, 926 P.2d 1290 (Haw. 1996); Phillips v. Thornerfelt, 
Nos. 85-CA-1075-S, 85- CA-1372-S, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1116 (Ky. Ct. App. April 25, 
1986); see also In re Vernon R., 1999 NMCA 125, 991 P.2d 986, 128 N.M. 242 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1999) (holding that a "status" exception was inapplicable to the specific facts of the 
case, but leaving open the question when a child's best interest is clearly at issue)." 
39Rhonda Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and PersonalJurisdiction, 1995 U. 111. 
L. Rev. 813, 866 (hereinafter "Wasserman"). 
40
 Id. at 869, citing Insurance Corp. oflr. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guineef 
456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 
n.l3(1985). 
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in those states.41 
2. The Theoretical Rationale. This rationale states that child custody litigation is in 
rem, and therefore no personal jurisdiction is required. Shaffer seriously undermines this 
rationale, having dispensed with the traditional labels of in rem, quasi-in-rem, or in personam 
jurisdiction.42 This is especially true in the child custody context, where fundamental liberty 
interests are at stake. 
3. The Doctrinal Rationale. This doctrine relies on footnote 30 Shaffer and the limited 
reading of May advocated by Bodenheimer. As for footnote 30, Wasserman notes that 
the Court most likely did not intend to include child custody adjudications 
within its blanket reference to "adjudications of status . . . ." The majority 
opinion offers divorce as the sole example of a status adjudication. It cites 
only Justice Traynor's article, Is This Conflict Really Necessary ? [37 Tex. L. 
Rev. 657, 660-61 (1959)] for the proposition that the particularized 
jurisdictional rules governing adjudications of status may conform to standards 
of fairness. On the pages cited by the Court, Justice Traynor's article purports 
to justify the status exception for divorce while distinguishing cases affecting 
the parent-child relationship: "There is an element of contract and some 
equality of parties in the marital relationship. These are lacking in the parent-
child relationship, and the interest of the state therefore becomes 
correspondingly larger in any action involving parent and child. Contracts [sic] 
of both parties with the state also take on larger and perhaps paramount 
importance, since the consequences of any action either declaring or 
terminating the relationship are so momentous to the parties. In conjunction 
with fair play, these considerations would normally preclude jurisdiction over 
a nonresident defendant having no contact with the forum state" [Traynor at 
661 (emphasis added.] In light of the Court's reference to divorce as the 
paradigmatic status case, its citation to Justice Traynor's article distinguishing 
divorce and parent-child cases, and Traynorfs acknowledgment that the latter 
4]Id. at 869-70. 
42Id. at 871-72. Wasserman argues that footnote 30 of Shaffer does not include 
child custody determinations in her discussion of the Doctrinal Rationale, discussed 
below. 
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typically require minimum contacts, it is highly unlikely that the Shaffer Court 
intended to include child custody cases within whatever exception footnote 
30 preserved.43 
In discussing May, she acknowledges that 
[ajdvocates of the status exception rely heavily on Justice Frankfurters 
concurring opinion for the proposition that May did not decide that the 
Wisconsin decree violated the Due Process Clause. Because Frankfurter's vote 
was necessary to reverse the judgment below, his view of what the Court 
decided has been widely accepted. It is difficult to accept Frankfurter's 
argument that the majority's opinion was grounded exclusively in the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause, and not in due process. After all, Justice Burton framed the 
issue in terms of Wisconsin's authority to terminate Leona's custody rights 
without acquiring jurisdiction over her. This is an issue of due process. 
Likewise, Burton concluded that "a mother's right to custody of her children 
is a personal right entitled to at least as much protection as her right to 
alimony"— that is, due process protection. Additionally, Burton cited three 
state cases for the proposition that custody decrees rendered without personal 
service on or the appearance of the nonresident parent are void. Thus, the 
most plausible reading of the majority opinion is that a custody decree entered 
without in personam jurisdiction over one of the contestants violates due 
process and is not entitled to interstate enforcement. Granted, Justice 
Frankfurter interpreted what the majority held differently and so stated in his 
separate concurrence. But instead of concurring only in the judgment, 
Frankfurter joined Justice Burton's opinion, adding the fifth vote, and making 
the majority opinion the law of the land. 
The Court has not overruled May; indeed, in the years since 1953, 
Supreme Court Justices have cited May in eighteen opinions. [44] Most of the 
citations have been for the uncontroversial propositions that the private realm 
43Id. at 872-73 (footnotes omitted). Cf Christopher L. Blakesley, Comparativist 
Ruminations from the Bayou on Child Custody Jurisdiction: the UCCJA, the PKPA, and 
the Hague Convention on Child Abduction, 58 La. L. Rev. 449, 508 (1998). (ff[R]eading 
Shaffer to except child custody matters from the requirement of some form of in 
personam jurisdiction or other substantive due process fairness is not within Shaffer's 
holding and is inconsistent with constitutional law and policy relating to both child 
protection and parental authority and interests."). 
44Most notably, in Stanley the Court cited May for the nonjurisdictional proposition 
that the right to have and raise a family is "more precious than property right,"405 U.S. 
645, 651 (1972), and again with approval in Kulko, 436 U.S. 84, 97 (1978). 
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of family life is protected from governmental intrusion or that parents have a 
significant interest in the companionship and care of their children or that 
children have a special place in life, which the law should reflect, or that child 
custody cases involve different interests than cases involving alimony or the 
termination of parental rights. But while the Court has not clearly reaffirmed 
May's holding, it has not disavowed it either. May is still good law. Because 
May holds that due process requires a state court to acquire in personam 
jurisdiction over parents before adjudicating custody, May seriously 
undermines, rather than supports, the status exception for child custody.45 
4. The Expediency Rationale. This rationale relies on the state's right to place a child 
within its borders with a suitable parent, and that the state can enforce that decree irrespective 
of whether personal jurisdiction lies against a parent. Wasserman argues that not only does 
this rationale violate the federalist notion that states should cooperate in the enforcement of 
decrees, it actually supports the requirement of personal jurisdiction, since custody decrees 
require interstate cooperation to be fully effective. Not least important is the fact that 
jurisdictional limits exist not to ensure easy enforcement of judgments, but 
rather to protect litigants from the inconvenience occasioned by suit in a 
distant forum. Thus, even if courts with power over the children could ensure 
enforcement of their custody decrees, and even if in personam jurisdiction 
over the parents made enforcement no easier, the Constitution would protect 
the defending parents from litigation in fora in which they would suffer 
meaningful inconvenience.46 
5. The Futility Rationale. This rationale defers to the notion that requiring jurisdiction over 
the parents in a custody determination does not guarantee that the parents will appear in 
court. This "Why bother?" doctrine fails because 
[j]urisdictional limits are designed to afford defendants a reasonable 
opportunity to appear in a convenient forum, not to assure their appearance.. 
45Id. at 877-78 (citations omitted). 
46Id. at 879-80 (citations omitted). 
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. . . Indeed, requiring states to acquire in personam jurisdiction over all 
contestants in custody proceedings actually would help procure the attendance 
of the parties because once a court acquires jurisdiction over a person, it can 
compel her attendance at trial via a subpoena.47 
6. The Benevolent Rationale. This rationale applies in rare but hard cases where minium 
contacts analysis would make adjudication of custody impossible, such as in the case of a 
foreign parent. This rationale spawned much of the confusion and indeterminacy of custody 
decrees before enactment of the UCCJA: states would exert jurisdiction willy-nilly in an 
atmosphere of uncertainty that promoted child snatching (which is what is happening to Mr. 
Osborne). "Thus," notes Wasserman, "although most of us would agree that the child's 
interests are paramount, great care and prudence are required in determining the actions and 
procedures that actually promote these interests."48 
Her solution to the problem facing this Court with Mr. Osborne is quite simple: Even 
if the child's home state (here, arguendo, Utah) lacks personal jurisdiction over all of the 
contestants, as long as some state can acquire such jurisdiction, the availability of "residual 
jurisdiction" should resolve the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.49 Here, North Carolina 
fits the bill. It has jurisdiction over the adoptive parents inasmuch as they affirmatively 
sought adoption of a North Carolina child, and, were the father's jurisdictional rights 
recognized, would be compelled to initiate adoption proceedings in North Carolina. They 
certainly have sufficient contact with Kenneth's home state by attempting to wrest custody 
41
 Id. at 881-82 (citations omitted). 
*Hd at 890. 
"Id. at 889-90. 
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of North Carolina child to be amenable to jurisdiction there. (Indeed, if the UCCJEA 
applied to adoptions, Mr. Osborne's UCCJEA petition would have effected this very result). 
Wasserman further argues that 
[e]ven if this interpretation of the UCCJA is not accepted, however, arguing 
that the Constitution should succumb to a statute invites the tail to wag the 
dog. If personal jurisdiction over the contestants is a constitutional 
requirement, and if the statute that authorizes courts to exercise subject matter 
jurisdiction in child custody cases fails to acknowledge that requirement, the 
problem is a poor fit between the Constitution and the statute. In such cases, 
the statute must be amended. It cannot be, as the benevolent rationale appears 
to argue, that the Constitution must be ignored.50 
Wasserman's basic point is that the UCCJA and Restatement of Conflicts ignore 
jurisdictional requirements under the Constitution.51 In other words, the emperor has no 
clothes. Her conclusion is shared, in varying degrees, by others.52 
50Id. at 887. 
51
 Cf. Barbara Ann Atwood, Child Custody Jurisdiction and Territoriality, 52 Ohio 
St. L.J. 369, 394 (1991)("The 'problem' of May v. Anderson was almost buried by the 
drafters of the UCCJA. The Commissioners1 explicit reliance on the status exception to 
personal jurisdiction has a convenient appeal, but the status exception, upon examination, 
does not seem to support the judicial authority necessary for determinations of custody."). 
Atwood's approach rejects status in favor of a territory-based jurisdiction echoing the 
1990 case of Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), in which the Supreme 
Court approved transitory jurisdiction. Her theory that the child is the territorial predicate 
for jurisdiction under Burnham is misplaced in cases of wrongful transfers or abductions, 
especially when the result is termination, not mere modification of a custody order. Such 
abduction with terminal consequences certainly does not satisfy the fairness component of 
which Justice Scalia speaks in Burnham's majority opinion, and which the other justices 
considered more forcefully in that case (echoing, logically, the fairness requirements of 
International Shoe and its progeny). 
51
 See, e.g. Russell M. Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: Jurisdiction, Recognition, 
and Enforcement, 66 Minn. L. Rev. 711 (1982); Ann Bradford Stevens, Is Failure to 
Support a Minor Child in the State Sufficient Contact with that State to Justify In 
Personam Jurisdiction?, 17 S. 111. U. L. J. 491, 501-03 (1993)(agreeing with Wasserman's 
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H. Personal Jurisdiction and the Putative Father in Adoption: The Natural Father's 
Constitutional Protections Accord with Extending Him the Protections of the Minimum 
Contacts/Reasonableness Standard 
The calls for child-based jurisdiction raised by Bodenheimer, even if accepted in the 
face of the criticism cited above, should be limited to custody determinations, where the 
parental right of the absent parent are being modified, not terminated. Termination is not 
modification, and stricter due process requirements attach to termination than modification. 
Two cases define the standards governing termination of parental rights. In Lassiter 
v. Department of Social Services51 the Court determined that a parent whose child had been 
temporarily removed from his or her custody because of neglect nonetheless had a due 
process liberty interest in his relationship with the child, such that if indigent, the parent 
might have a constitutional right to appointed counsel. Thus, a parent whose ability to care 
for the child has already been thrown into doubt nonetheless has a constitutional interest in 
the child. Likewise, in Santosky v. Kramer54 the Court held that a "natural parent's" liberty 
interest in his or her relationship with the child mandated that the state show "permanent 
neglect" by clear and convincing evidence before it may terminate the parent's parental rights. 
Custody adjudications do not terminate parental rights. Because they are not afforded 
reading of May); Herma Hill Kay, Adoption in the Conflict of Laws: The UAA, Not the 
UCCJA, Is the Answer, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 703, 731-741 (1996). 
Given the reasoning of these commentators and the cases cited therein, it strains 
credulity when the State of Utah argues in its In re W.A. brief that " . . . . there is no reason 
to believe the United States Supreme Court would not apply the status exception to 
terminations and other child custody determinations." Brief in Chief at 26. 
53452U.S. 18(1981) 
54455 U.S. 745 (1982) 
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the same constitutional strictures afforded termination proceedings, it is easier to argue away 
personal jurisdiction in favor of status or territory based notions in custody matters, as 
opposed to the irreversible (and constitutionally sensitive) termination of parental rights. 
Because adoption entails termination of parental rights, putative fathers are potentially 
entitled to the same protections afforded any father in an adoption proceeding. "Potentially" 
because not all fathers can show Lehr fatherhood, but there are those, like Mr. Osborne, that 
may be able to do so. If a father can show Lehr fatherhood, he is, for all intents and 
purposes, entitled to the same due process protections afforded by the Supreme Court, 
protections grounded in the father's liberty interest in being a father.55 Those protections are 
derived from the "biological rights" of a father to raise his child, since a natural parent is 
generally regarded as best suited to raise his or her child.56 
55See, e.g., Nale v. Robertson, 871 S.W.2d 674 (Tenn. 1994)(adoptions cannot go 
forward until parental rights are terminated under applicable Tennessee law). 
56Toni L. Craig , Establishing the Biological Rights Doctrine to Protect Unwed 
Fathers in Contested Adoptions, 25 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 391, 403-405 (1998) ("When an 
unwed father contests the at-birth adoption of his child, the federal Constitution requires 
application of the biological rights doctrine. This conclusion follows from analysis of 
United States Supreme Court cases that have held the Fourteenth Amendment protects 
parents' significant interests in a relationship with their children, third parties have no 
liberty interest in a relationship with a child not biologically connected to them, and that 
the "best interests of the child'1 is not a proper standard to determine whether to terminate 
a biological parent's rights. Cases involving contested at-birth adoptions are analogous to 
[Stanley, in which] the only countervailing state interest was the state's desire to protect 
the welfare of children. As the Stanley Court opined, the state's interest would be served, 
rather than hampered, by awarding a fit, unwed biological father custody of his children. 
Thus, the federal Constitution requires adherence to the biological rights doctrine in 
contested at-birth adoption cases because the unwed father has a fundamental right in his 
parental relationship, and the state has no substantial interest that would justify burdening 
that right. . . . In addition to being required by the Federal Constitution, the biological 
rights doctrine serves certain state social, economic, and administrative interests. First, 
39 
As has been suggested, there are putative fathers and putative fathers. Many do not 
rise to Lehr fatherhood, and therefore have no rights under Lehr. Others have perfected their 
rights. Most compelling is the case of the "faultless father," that is, the putative father who 
tries to develop a relationship with his child but is thwarted in doing so.57 The rights of such 
fathers should not be derived exclusively from assessing the best interest of the child ("Don't 
take away my daddy"), but rather from his lost opportunity to develop a relationship with his 
child ("Don't take away my child").58 State courts have taken their cue from the Supreme 
the biological rights doctrine prevents the state from social engineering, which is inherent 
in making a "best interests" judgment.. . . Second, the biological rights doctrine confirms 
that the rights of biological parents are firmly rooted in natural law, religion, and social 
dictates. . . . Third, presuming that a biological parent is fit brings adoption contests to 
finality by simplifying termination proceedings. . . . Fourth, the biological rights doctrine 
encourages individual responsibility by allowing the birth father to assume the burden of 
caring for, nurturing, and supporting his child. . . . Finally, the biological rights doctrine 
places the father on a more level playing field with the mother. ") 
57
"[T]he Court's cases seem to contemplate only two models of fatherhood: the 
man of virtue who is integrally involved in the rearing of his children and the scofflaw 
who has slept on his rights while others changed diapers and read bedtime stories. The 
Court's cases do not squarely resolve what should be done with the father who falls 
somewhere in between these two poles—for example, the man who has done everything 
he reasonably could to establish a relationship with his child but who has been thwarted 
by circumstances beyond his control." David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the 
Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless Father, 41 Ariz. L. Rev. 753, 763 
(1999)(hereinafter "Meyer"). The "thwarted father" is yet another name for the faultless 
father. See Kristin Morgan-Tracy, The Right of the Thwarted Father to Veto the Adoption 
of His Child, 62 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 1695 (1994)(citing with approval Swayne v. L.D.S. Soc. 
Servs., 795 P.2d 637 (Utah 1990)). 
58
 "[I]f the Constitution afforded no protection at all to purely potential 
relationships, that provided a short and complete answer to Lehr's constitutional challenge 
to the adoption of his daughter; instead, the Lehr Court felt compelled to reject Lehr's 
claim on the narrower ground that New York's Putative Father Registry gave him a 
constitutionally sufficient opportunity to 'grasp' his opportunity at parenthood." Meyer at 
766. Meyer argues further that the rationale behind Santosky, which requires that 
40 
Court in repeatedly siding with the father-based rights inquiry.59 
This Court has taken the vanguard in forwarding this argument. InEllis v. LDS Social 
Services this Court noted the possible existence of faultless fathers, stating, 
In the usual case, the putative father would either know or reasonably should 
know approximately when and where his child was born. It is conceivable, 
however, that a situation may arise when it is impossible for the father to file 
the required notice of paternity prior to the statutory bar, through no fault of 
his own. In such a case, due process requires that he be afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to comply with the statute.60 
Subsequent cases emanating from this Court demonstrate its sensitivity to the plight of the 
faultless father, a sensitivity acknowledged by, and not abrogated by, the current adoption 
code.61 If the revisions to that code mandated by this Court, either expressly or impliedly, 
termination of parental rights be predicated on unfitness (which in turn must be proved by 
clear and convincing evidence) underscores the requirement that some fault be attributed 
to the father whose rights are being terminated. Meyer at 783-85. 
59
"In both [the Baby Richard and Baby Jessica] cases, the state supreme courts 
regarded the fathers as blameless victims of the machinations of others and held, in effect, 
that the Constitution would not permit these men to suffer the loss of fatherhood when 
they had done nothing to warrant such a grievous penalty." Id. Cf. In re J. P., 648 P.2d 
1364, 1368-69 (Utah 1982; (holding that the welfare of the child may not be considered 
without prior determination that the parent is unfit). See also In re M.N.M., 605 A.2d 
921, 928-29 (D.C.), cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 636 (1992)("Because the child, without [the 
father's] knowledge, was placed in the custody of the adoption agency almost from the 
moment of birth, [the father] had no opportunity to develop a relationship with his 
offspring,... which he can be said to have abandoned by his subsequent conduct.... We 
hold that appellant sufficiently asserted his parental interest and therefore may claim 
"substantial protection under the Due Process Clause.") (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 
U.S. 248, 262, 261 (1983)). 
60615 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1980). 
61
 This Court has repeatedly considered fault material in assessing a putative 
father's rights. See, e.g., Swayne v. L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 795 P.2d 637, 642-43 (Utah 1990) 
(timely registration not reasonably impossible when mother and father both Utah 
A\ 
fail to remedy injustices wrought upon the faultless father, this Court's reasoning and 
philosophy in Ellis and its progeny still control. 
Faultless fathers suffer insult over injury if a state asserts jurisdiction over them 
without minimum contacts or reasonableness. If "no-fault1' termination is a suspect 
enterprise under Utah's reading of the Constitution, it becomes palpably infirm when 
colliding with the notions of fair play and substantial justice necessary for the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction. Faultless fathers should not be dragged into foreign courts simply to 
establish their status as such. In this respect a faultless father's due process rights as a parent 
(protected by Santosky and Lassiter) tie directly into his due process right to defend against 
termination of his parentage in a foreign jurisdiction. One would then wonder, at the risk that 
a father may truly be faultless, why any court would ever attempt to assert jurisdiction based 
residents, father maintained contact with mother and child, and father knew that mother 
was considering relinquishing the child for adoption); Wells v. Children's Aid Soc'y of 
Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 207-08 (Utah 1984)(timely registration not reasonably impossible 
where ffbirth occurred in the same state as the father's residence," father had "ample 
advance notice of the expected time of birth and the fact that the mother intended to 
relinquish the child for adoption," and "neither the child's mother nor the adoption agency 
was involved in any effort to prevent him from learning of the birth or from asserting his 
parental rights"); Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 680 P.2d 753 (Utah 1984)(timely 
registration not reasonably impossible where father resided in Utah, maintained contact 
with mother throughout pregnancy, and knew of her plans to relinquish child for 
adoption); In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 111 P.2d 686, 690-91 (Utah 1986)(timely 
registration was not reasonably possible, and therefore constitutionally must be excused, 
where mother knew of out-of-state father's objections to adoption and misrepresented that 
she would not relinquish child); Adoption ofW., 904 P.2d 1113,1120-21 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995)(per curiam)(mother's undisclosed move from Indiana to Nevada for delivery of 
child and surrender of child for adoption in Utah reasonably excused father's initial failure 
to register paternity claim in Utah, but did not excuse his failure to register for eight 
months after learning of the Utah adoption proceeding). These citations paraphrase 
Professor Meyer's citation of the same cases at note 174. 
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on a bald assumption that the father cannot show Lehr fatherhood.62 
I. Mr. Osborne Could Prevail Under Either Utah or North Carolina Under the Facts 
of This Case. 
Whether Mr. Osborne is a "faultless father" may be a matter of dispute, the agency 
agreeing with the Court of Appeals that the mother's single isolated contact with Utah 
disqualify him from invoking Utah's foreign father exception63 and therefore subjects him 
to the foil requirements of Utah law. Because Mr. Osborne's argument is purely 
jurisdictional, those issues are not in play in this appeal. 64 Nevertheless, this Court, in 
assessing the "fairness" aspect of the jurisdictional inquiry, should consider that the agency's 
argument is ephemeral. The mother's unlawfully coming to Utah to have the child, then 
changing her mind and returning to live in Mr. Osborne's home for five months, and then 
equivocating again and coming back to Utah, did not require Mr. Osborne to assume she 
could return to Utah at any time during this period.65 
More compelling still is that under North Carolina law Mr. Osborne's consent is 
62Ironically, this is exactly what Judge Hansen did when he ex parte purported to 
terminate Mr. Osborne's rights, taking the risk that Mr. Osborne is indeed a faultless 
father. 
63
 Utah Code Annot. § 78-30-4.15 (Supp. 2001). 
64Mr. Osborne folly intends to raise section 78-30-4.15 if his jurisdictional 
challenge is denied, along with the fact that the six-month period in section 78-30-4.14 (in 
which a father is presumed to not have any Lehr relationship whatsoever outside of the 
statutory criteria) is unconstitutional as applied to him, a father who had an actual and 
supportive relationship with a child up to five months after birth. 
65There is no dispute that Mr. Osborne did not know of Kenneth's second trip to 
Utah until after relinquishment. 
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required to Kenneth's adoption because he held Kenneth out as his son for five months and 
cared for Kenneth in his home.66 This makes him truly faultless. 
J. The Adoption Code Fails to Provide for Procedural Due Process, Nor Was any 
Procedural Due Process Afforded Mr. Osborne 
The State of Utah argued in its brief in In re W.A., No. 20020236-SC, currently 
pending before this court on certiorari, that even if traditional personal jurisdiction was not 
required over a father in termination proceeding, he still had the protection of procedural due 
process by being notified and given the opportunity for a hearing. Brief in Chief at 23, 35-
37. That is not the case under the Utah Adoption Code. No putative father, faultless or no, 
is extended such protections. As such, what the State argues is a saving catch for the 
Termination of Parental Rights Act is no save at all for the Adoption Code.67 
Where practicable (and in Mr. Osborne's case, the fact that Kenneth lived in Mr. 
Osborne's home and was held out as his child meant that it would have been very 
practicable), putative fathers should be extended the same procedural due process protections 
guaranteed by the termination act. Giving notice early in the proceedings guarantees a 
"clean" adoption, eliminating the possibility of future collateral attack and the Hobson's 
66N.C.C.A. §§ 48-2-401, -404; N.C.C.A. § 48-3-601 (2)(b)(5). 
67Apart from the more substantial procedural protections and higher burden of 
proof contained in the Termination of Parental Rights Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-401 
through -414 (1996 & Supp. 2001), as contrasted with the Utah Adoption Code, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-30-1 through -19 (Supp. 2001), the facts in In re W.A. differ 
substantially from those here, especially with respect to the father's contacts with the Stat 
of Utah (the child there had received substantial benefits from Utah since 1996). Thus, 
the fairness and minimum contacts analysis in In re W.A. is so dissimilar so as to be 
inapplicable to Mr. Osborne's case. 
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choice between a "high-risk" adoption and no adoption at all.68 
Responsible practitioners in this area give notice at the outset to prevent such results, 
but this is not always the norm. The rampant and reprehensible pattern of "duck and cover" 
adoptions in the State of Utah, often of foreign children by foreign adoptive parents, is the 
result of failing to afford procedural due process guarantees.69 Indeed, Mr. Osborne has been 
68
 Cf Joan H. Hollinger, Adoption Procedure, in 1 ADOPTION LAW AND 
PRACTICE (Joan H. Hollinger ed., 2002)(attitude toward adoptions may be 
characterized in three ways: (1) increased reluctance to force a mother to divulge 
information about a putative father and more systematic efforts to set limits for seeking 
information about the father from other sources; (2) increased wariness about granting 
parental rights to putative fathers who have not come forward of their own volition; and 
(3) increased recognition of the risks to the child posed by delays in resolving the father's 
status; and as a consequence, fewer placements of a child in the limbo of foster care, and 
more placements on an "at risk" basis with the prospective adoptive parents.); Putative 
Fathers' Rights: Striking the Right Balance in Adoption Laws, 20 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 
930 (1994); Katherine L. Corley, Removing the Bar Sinister: Adoption Rights of Putative 
Fathers, 15 Cumb. L. Rev. 499, 516 (1984-85)(stating that statutes that do not sufficiently 
protect the putative father furnish him, even if he has no sincere interest in the child, with 
a means to "complicate, impede, and perhaps even prevent the adoption"). 
The necessity of notice is beyond argument. Apart from the state's refuge behind 
notice in its arguments in In re W.A., No. 20020236-SC (Appellant's Brief in Chief at 23, 
35), commentators have advocated notice to putative fathers as a requirement in adoption 
statutes to protect the father's constitutional rights and, derivatively, to insulate adoptions 
from collateral attack. Elizabeth A. Hadad , Tradition and the Liberty Interest: 
Circumscribing the Rights of the Natural Father: Michael H. v. Gerald D., 56 Brooklyn 
L. Rev. 291 (1990). Indeed, one commentator even argues that putative fathers have a 
constitutional right to know that their child exists. John R. Hamilton, The Unwed Father 
and the Right to Know of His Child's Existence, 76 Ky. L.J. 949 (1988). 
69Such cases do occur. For example, in a recent case pending before the Fourth 
Judicial District Court, Utah County, Vazquez v. Adoption Center of Choice, No. 
002400156, the Court issued a preliminary injunction blasting the defendant agency's 
having secured post hoc permission for service by publication and other lackluster 
attempts to notify the Alabama father of a seven-month-old child. The opinion is attached 
as Exhibit 42. Notable about the case is that the child was from Alabama and the 
adoptive parents were from yet a different state than Utah. This prompts the question, 
Why is Utah even involved? Forum shopping is the answer, inasmuch as Utah's 
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subject to two instances where he was denied procedural due process guarantees. The first 
was when the adoption was initiated (to this day, he does not know in which court it is 
pending). The second is when the Fourth District Judicial Court purported to terminate his 
rights ex parte as a result of a motion filed against him ex parte. The first violation was 
clearly unconstitutional. The second was not only that: it was so unbelievable that it appears 
to be fictional. Upon realizing its reality, one can only call it ghastly. 
Without procedural due process protections, exercising jurisdiction over nonresident 
putative fathers without an independent basis for such jurisdiction lacks any saving grace. 
It is simply unconstitutional. 
K. Notions of Comity to North Carolina Disfavor Jurisdiction 
Arguments in favor of the nationalization of jurisdiction under the UCCJEA rely 
heavily on comity as the basis for rejecting May. Apart from the conceptual problems posed 
by this somewhat artificial approach (discussed above), there is a more immediate, practical 
problem: North Carolina is hopping mad about Kenneth's adoption. A North Carolina court 
has enjoined the adoption, and the North Carolina Department of Social Services has also 
objected, stating that Kenneth has received benefits in North Carolina and that this adoption 
Adoption Code is one of the most hostile to putative fathers in the nation. "The lack of 
uniformity in state law leads to considerable pressure to engage in forum shopping. 
Results achievable under the laws of one state may not be possible in another. Efforts to 
tighten regulations in some states have been undermined by laws and practices in other 
states that are less attentive to the ethical and chil-protective aspects of adoption 
practice.,f Joan H. Hollinger, Adoption Procedure, in 1 ADOPTION LAW AND 
PRACTICE 4-9 (Hollinger ed., 2002). The Vazquez case is brought to the Court's 
attention not for any precedential effect, but for the sole reason that such cases are not 
mere hypothetical fantasy or academic ruminations. 
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should have been subject to Interstate Compact supervision.70 
It thus makes little sense on these facts to adopt a jurisdictional construct based on 
comity when there is no comity whatsoever. North Carolina views Utah as somewhat of a 
bully in this matter. The comity rationale is thus not only inapplicable; it is nonsensical. 
II. EXERCISING JURISDICTION OVER MR. OSBORNE VIOLATES THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION 
Exercising jurisdiction over Mr. Osborne violates the Utah Constitution in three 
respects: it violates due process under Article I, section 7 (due process), Article I, section 11 
(open courts), and Article I, section 24 (uniform application of laws). 
The article 7 violations are essentially similar to the due process violations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment: 
1. Utah cannot exercise personal jurisdiction without a showing of minimum 
contacts and fairness. 
2. Utah cannot deprive Mr. Osborne of his parental rights without notice (a 
violation of procedural due process). 
3. Mr. Osborne cannot be deemed to have waived his due process objections to 
jurisdiction simply bu his appearing in Utah courts to challenge jurisdiction, 
and jurisdiction only. 
The section 11 arguments are different substantively than any federal violation. 
Section 11 provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall 
be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this state, by 
himself or counsel any civil cause to which he is a party. 
70The Compact requires each state's administrator to review the placement to 
ensure that state law has been met. Utah Code Annot. § 62A-4a-701 (2002). In this case, 
North Carolina law was not met because Mr. Osborne's consent was required. 
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In assessing a claim under this article, this Court has stated that 
a statutory classification that discriminates against a person's constitutionally 
protected right to a remedy for personal injury under Article I, section 11 is 
constitutional only if it (1) is reasonable, (2) has more than a speculative 
tendency to further the legislative objective and, in fact, actually and 
substantially furthers a valid legislative purpose, and (3) is reasonably 
necessary to further a legitimate legislative goal.71 
The legislature's attempt to exercise authority over foreign fathers without their 
having requisite contacts with Utah satisfies none of these criteria. Moreover, a reading of 
In re B.B.D. creating a self-executing waiver of a jurisdictional defense means that there is 
no forum in which such a defense may be raised. This is a violation of section 11. There is 
no legitimate legislative purpose in forcing foreign putative fathers to submit to Utah 
jurisdiction and law. 
The same is true under Article I, section 24. It provides 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." Although this 
provision is sometimes thought to have the same effect and impose the same 
legal standards on legislative action as the equal protection guarantee found in 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the language and 
history of the two provisions are entirely different, and even though there are 
important areas of overlap in the concepts embodied in the two provisions, the 
differences can produce different legal consequences. . . . 
For a law to be constitutional under Article I, section 24, it is not 
enough that it be uniform on its face. What is critical is that the operation of 
the law be uniform. A law does not operate uniformly if "persons similarly 
situated" are not "treated similarly" or if "persons in different circumstances" 
are "treated as if their circumstances were the same." Malan v. Lewis, 693 
P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984).72 
Under section 24, nonresident putative fathers are treated differently than Utah 
lxLee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 582-83 (Utah 1993). 
72Id. at 577. 
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residents. They are forced to appear in Utah to defend their rights, even if those rights are 
unquestionable. And, as noted, the savings clause in section 78-30-4.15 is insufficient to 
remedy this problem, since even with that clause a nonresident father must still come to Utah 
to not only claim his child, but to prove his rights over that child. 
III. THIS COURT'S TASK: TO RULE ON THESE ISSUES NOW, WITHOUT REMAND 
This matter is not an appeal from a lower court's ruling, but rather is on certiorari 
from the Court of Appeal's denial of an Original Petition. That denial was erroneous both 
because the Court of Appeals ruled on issues not raised in Mr. Osborne's Original Petition 
(namely, how Utah law applied to him, an irrelevant notion), and dismissed the jurisdictional 
issue on an indefensible basis (the birth of Kenneth in Utah). 
The Original Petition requested a declaration that Mr. Osborne could raise his 
jurisdictional defense in district court without waiving it. He also asked that the court of 
adoption be revealed and that the adoption be stayed. Even though Mr. Osborne originally 
requested merely a remand with instructions and a safe harbor, the Court of Appeals 
preempted that request by stating that Mr. Osborne had no rights whatsoever. 
On certiorari this Court faces a case with undisputed facts, and one issue: does Utah 
have jurisdiction over Mr. Osborne? Judicial efficiency, combined with the history of this 
matter, dictate that this Court should rule on Mr. Osborne's jurisdictional contentions now. 
More important, the very rights Mr. Osborne endeavors to defend would be compromised by 
the further delay caused by a remand. Finally, and not insignificantly, whatever a lower court 
rules, this Court would undoubtedly revisit this issue after proceedings that will not 
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meaningfully enhance the record as presently constituted. 
CONCLUSION 
States are limited by the Constitution in their exercise of jurisdiction over 
nonresidents, both out of respect of fairness to the individuals and the sovereignty of the 
states. This is true with respect to putative fathers in adoption, given the importance of the 
rights at stake. Under this doctrine, Mr. Osborne has rights under the federal and Utah 
constitutions. Mr. Osborne's rights have been violated by Utah's exercise of authority over 
him and application of its law to him. This Court should dismiss the pending Utah adoption 
and cede authority over this matter to the North Carolina courts, which can make appropriate 
substantive orders regarding Kenneth's welfare and IN^Osborne's relationship with him. 
DATED this j £ L day of October, 2002. 
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Utah Court of Appeals 
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Clerk of the Court 
ORDER 
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Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Orme. 
This case is before the court on a petition for 
extraordinary relief. Petitioner seeks relief in the form of: 
1) a writ of mandamus against every district court in the state 
to prevent the finalization of the adoption scheduled for 
sometime after July 4, 2002; 2) an order to compel the adoption 
agency to reveal the identity of the adoptive parents; and 3) 
an order to allow the petitioner, alleging he is the biological 
father, to intervene in the adoption without waiving his 
objection to personal jurisdiction. 
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 [I] n the case of unmarried father, a biological 
relationship alone is insufficient to establish 
constitutionally protected parental rights." In re Adoption of 
B.B.D, 1999 UT 70,1110, 984 P.2d 967 (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 
463 U.S. 248, 257-60, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983)). Utah statutes 
governing the rights of an unmarried, biological father are 
self-operative. "When an illegitimate child is relinquished by 
its mother, the rights of the father are automatically 
terminated unless he has previously filed an acknowledgment of 
paternity." Swavne v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 795 P.2d 637, 640 
(Utah 1990). In order to preserve his rights, an unmarried 
father must: 1) initiate a proceeding to establish paternity; 
2) file notice of the commencement of paternity proceedings; 
and 3) pay a fair and reasonable amount of the expenses 
incurred by the pregnancy, if he had actual knowledge of it. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b) (Supp. 2001); see also In 
re Adoption of B.B.D, 1999 UT 70 at ^16. If an unmarried 
father fails to "fully and strictly comply" with all of these 
conditions before the mother relinquishes the child for 
adoption, he "is deemed to have waived and surrendered any 
right in relation to the child, including the right to notice 
of any judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of 
the child, and his consent to the adoption is not required." 
Id. 78-30-4.14(5). Petitioner has failed to establish he has 
met any of these requirements. He knew that the mother had 
given birth in Utah. Thereafter, the mother and child returned 
to North Carolina and temporarily resided with Petitioner. 
Nonetheless, Petitioner never took any legal action in either 
The Legislature has seen fit to offer additional 
protections to unmarried biological fathers residing in another 
state. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15.(4) provides: 
The Legislature finds that an unmarried 
biological father who resides in another 
state may not, in every circumstance, be 
reasonably presumed to know of, and strictly 
comply with, the requirements of this 
chapter. Therefore when all of the following 
requirements have been met, that unmarried 
biological father may contest an adoption, 
prior to the finalization of the decree of 
adoption, and assert his interest in the 
child; the court may then, in its discretion, 
proceed with an evidentiary hearing under 
Subsection 78-30-4.16(2): 
(d) the unmarried biological father has 
complied with the most stringent and complete 
requirements of the state where the mother 
previously resided or was located, in order 
to protect and preserve his parental interest 
and right in the child in cases of adoption. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15 (4) (d) . In this case, Petitioner 
clearly fails to meet at least the requirement under subsection 
(d) , because he took absolutely no legal action in his home state 
of North Carolina for the five months prior to the mother's 
relinquishment. Petitioner has simply failed to take any timely 
action to preserve his rights to this child. 
Regarding Petitioner's jurisdictional argument, the question 
of personal jurisdiction only arises when a defendant is called 
to defend an action in court. The district court did not need or 
attempt to exercise personal jurisdiction over Petitioner. He 
lost his rights to the child by operation of law when he failed 
to take the statutory steps required to protect his rights. See 
Swavne v. L.D.S. Social Servs. , 795 P. 2d at 640. Furthermore, it 
is Petitioner, as a plaintiff, seeking relief in Utah courts who 
has invoked the jurisdiction of the Utah courts. The fact that 
court action, and the operation of law, affected the father's 
unprotected parental rights does not implicate personal 
jurisdiction. If Petitioner wants to protect and assert his 
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ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE, a 
Utah Corporation, JOHN DOE and JANE 
DOE, Adoptive Parents, 
ORIGINAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
MANDAMUS AND TEMPORARY 
RESTRAINING ORDER 
Case No. 
Plaintiff Frank Osborne ("Osborne") here submits this Original Petition for Writ of 
Mandamus and Temporary Restraining Order. Osborne requests that the Writ of Mandamus issue 
against every district court in the State of Utah to enjoin the finalization of an adoption of his son, 
Kenneth Skyler Balcer IH, commenced by the defendants agency and adoptive parents, and for a 
decree that he may appear in a Utah court to challenge Utah5 s personal jurisdiction over him without 
waiving his defense that Utah has no personal jurisdiction over him. He requests that the Temporary 
Restraining Order issue against the agency and the adoptive parents to enjoin them from pursuing 
said finalization and to compel them to reveal the identity of the adoptive parents so they may be 
served with this action and orders therein, and any other actions he may deem necessary to secure 
relief, 
PERSONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE INTERESTS MIGHT BE SUBSTANTIALLY 
AFFECTED BY THIS PETITION 
1. The several district courts of the State of Utah. 
2. The Adoption Center of Choice, Inc., a Utah Coiporation. 
3. Adoptive parents John Doe and Jane Doe, who have concealed their identity. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Issue 
May a resident of North Carolina who is the natural father of a child who is also a resident 
of North Carolina, but which child has been placed for adoption in Utah, make as a plaintiff in a 
declaratory judgment action the equivalent of a "special appearance" in a Utah court, in order to 
request that said Utah court rule on whether Utah may exercise personal jurisdiction over him and 
apply Utah law to him, while at the same time not waiving his personal jurisdiction defense by mere 
virtue of his appearance? 
Relief Sought 
Mr. Osborne requests that this court issue a writ of mandamus against every district court 
in the state of Utah to enjoin any proceedings conducted to finalize the adoption of the child at issue 
in this matter, issue a temporary restraining order against the respondents from finalizing the 
adoption, issue a temporary restraining order against the Adoption Center of Choice to reveal the 
identity of the adoptive parents so they may be served and stayed, and finally to issue an order 
declaring that Mr. Osborne may either directly intervene in the adoption or bring a collateral action 
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underV.H.v.M.L., 894P.2d 1285 (UtaliApp. 1995), to challenge the pending adoption proceeding 
on jurisdictional grounds without waiving any personal jurisdiction defense. 
SUMMARY OF THE FACTS 
The facts of this matter are set forth in the Exhibits attached hereto, which comprise the 
record in this matter per Rule 19. This summary is prepared for the Court's convenience, and is 
divided into substantive and procedural facts. 
Substantive Facts 
The following facts issue exclusively from a petition filed by Mr. Osborne On February 14-, 
2002, in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County under the Utah Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to challenge that court's subject matter jurisdiction over 
any proceeding regarding the adoption or custody of Kenneth Skyler Baker HI. A copy of that 
petition is attached as Exhibit 1. 
Mr. Osborne is a North Carolina resident with no contacts with Utah whatsoever. He 
entered into a relationship with Angela Baker in November of 2000, and in December, 2000, Ms. 
Baker informed him that she was pregnant. Petitioner resolved at that time to provide for the new 
child and regarded the new child, Ms. Baker and her son, D.J., as a family unit for which he was 
responsible. 
In January, 2001, Mr. Osborne bought a new home located at 1201 Alberto Lane in Stanley, 
North Carolina. He moved into this home along with Ms. Baker and DJ. hi February, 2001, Ms. 
Baker was instructed by her doctor to be on bed rest because her pregnancy was regarded by her 
physician as being high risk. She followed the doctor's instructions and continued to live in the 
home Mr. Osborne has purchased. 
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In March, 2001, Ms. Baker's mother moved into the house. Mr. Osborne too the burden to 
support her, also. Ms. Baker continued to live in Mr. Osborne's home through July, 2001. It was 
during this month that Ms. Baker first called an adoption agency called An Act of Love. Petitioner 
discovered that she had made contact with the adoption agency and expressed his disapproval. Ms. 
Baker represented at that point that she would not place the baby for adoption and attributed her 
actions to the fact that her psychiatric medications were apparently not working properly. Later that 
night, she checked herself into the local mental health center uttering suicide threats. 
-After Ms. Baker retumed-from the mental health center and moved back into the home, 
petitioner continued his work schedule. One day at work he was informed by a neighbor that Ms. 
Baker and her mother had taken all of their possessions from the home and moved out. Petitioner 
contacted Ms. Baker's aunt who informed him that she had flown to Utah where a doctor had 
induced labor and where she was about to place the baby for adoption. 
On August 6,2001, Ms. Baker called petitioner at work from Utah. She told petitioner that 
she had borne a son and that she was coming home with the baby boy and DJ. On August 7,2001, 
she traveled back to North Carolina by bus. The child was in Utah for one day. 
Upon returning, Ms. Baker went to her mother's home for one week. She then indicated that 
she wished to return to the residence Mr. Osborne had purchased. Petitioner and his father moved 
Ms. Baker and her mother back into the home. 
From August to October, 2001, Ms. Baker, Mr. Osborne, D.J. and Ms. Baker's mother lived 
together in petitioner's home. Ms. Baker and Mr. Osborne had anumber of conversations regarding 
the fact that the child did not bear petitioner's name. During this time also, Ms. Baker would 
continue to have episodes of emotional or psychological distress. She would act out inappropriately 
and occasionally throw tilings. Petitioner ascribed her conduct to her psychological condition. 
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During this entire time, D.J., Ms. Baker's son, and the baby boy developed a bonding 
relationship. Also during the time between August and October, 2001, Mr. Osborne took over the 
responsibility of maintaining bookkeeping responsibilities for the family. Their financial situation 
thereafter started to improve. Mr. Osborne enlisted the help of his mother in order to balance the 
family books. 
In November and December, 2001, the financial situation of the family continued to 
improve. Ms. Balcer would from time to time express dissatisfaction with not being in control of the 
books; but the-financialsituation was improving: D;Jrandihebaby continued~to develop a bonding 
relationship during this time. Thanksgiving 2001 was celebrated with Ms. Baker's family. 
Petitioner cooked and prepared the Thanksgiving meal. This was at Ms. Baker's family's residence 
in Stanley, North Carolina. 
In early December, 2001, in an effort to rectify the fact that the child was not named after 
petitioner, petitioner twice secured a blank Affidavit for Voluntary Declaration of Paternity for 
execution under North Carolina law. Ms. Balcer signed both of these documents but then became 
distressed and ripped the documents up in front of petitioner. 
During the month of December, 2001, petitioner and Ms. Baker's relationship deteriorated. 
Even so, petitioner and Ms. Baker continued to cohabit in Mr. Osborne's home, and petitioner 
continued to provide for Ms. Balcer, D J. and the baby. In mid-December of 2001, the relationship 
deteriorated to the point that Ms. Balcer took D. J. and the baby and moved out of the house and took 
many of the possessions of both Ms. Balcer and Mr. Osborne with her, includmg Mr. Osborne's tools 
of trade. Upon leaving, Ms. Balcer also did damage to the house. 
On December 15,2001, Ms. Baker contacted Mr. Osborne's mother and asked if she could 
take the baby to the hospital for an ear infection and respiratory distress. She also indicated that she 
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needed those items that she was accustomed to Mr. Osborne providing (diapers, gas drops, formula, 
etc.). Petitioner complied with these requests. 
On December 28, 2001, Ms. Baker came to petitioner's home and picked up Christmas 
presents that had been purchased by Mr. Osborne for both D.J. and for the baby. December 28, 
2001, was the last time that Mr. Osborne has seen the baby. In early January, 2002, he received a 
call from Ms. Baker, and she left a message on his answering machine stating that she was going to 
Utah, and that he "had no chance in hell" of getting him back because Mi*. Osborne could not fight 
the State of-Utah and could not win-there. 
At this juncture, petitioner called the Department of Social Services in Gastonia, North 
Carolina and spoke with Patricia L. Hovis. Later in January, 2002, Ms. Baker returned to North 
Carolina and informed petitioner that she had placed the child for adoption with an adoption agency 
called The Adoption Center of Choice. Petitioner contacted The Adoption Center of Choice for 
information regarding the adoption and was given none. 
In his communication with The Adoption Center of Choice, petitioner was informed that 
the child had been placed with a set of adoptive parents located in the State of Utah. This 
communication was confirmed by further representations made by the adoptive mother, Ms. Baker. 
The agency and/or adoptive parents failed to secure the approval of the North Carolina or 
Utah administrator of the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children before the filmg of the 
adoption petition in question. 
Procedural Facts 
1. As noted, on February 14, 2002, Mr. Osborne filed a UCCJEA petition. In the 
petition, Mr. Osborne denied and specifically disavowed seeldng any substantive relief from the state 
court apart from a ruling that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter. The 
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challenge to subject matter jurisdiction was predicated on the fact that neither the plaintiff nor the 
child were residents of the state of Utah, and that the child had been transported to Utah unlawfully. 
2. In his petition, the plaintiff did not attempt to collaterally attack the adoption that 
he has alleged is now pending in the State of Utah, nor did he bring any challenge to the court's 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. The petition was narrowly tailored pursuant to the terms 
of the UCCJEA for the sole purpose of triggering that statute's provisions, which required a 
jurisdictional self-examination by the court in which the petition was filed. 
-3, Mr. Osborne filed-contemporaneously with his UCCJEA petition with the Fourth 
Judicial District Court an Ex Parte Motion to Open Adoption File under Section 78-30-15, U.C.A., 
requesting that the court issue an order divulging the case number of the pending adoption 
proceeding, wherever in the state it might be, in order to secure the identity of the adoptive parents 
and to determine the status of the proceeding that had been occurring in derogation of his rights. A 
copy of the motion is attached as Exhibit 2, and a copy of the supporting memorandum is attached 
as Exhibit 3. 
4. The District Court refused to issue such a mandamus, but rather instructed the clerk 
of the Fourth Judicial District, and only the Fourth Judicial District, to search the records for an 
adoption concerning Kenneth Skyler Baker IE. The court concluded that it did not have the power 
to compel clerks in other districts to conduct such a search, or to divulge the information requested. 
A copy of the court's ruling is attached as Exhibit 4. 
5. OnFebruary 19,2002, Mr. Osborne filed a motion to reconsider (Exhibit 5), which 
was supported by a memorandum (Exhibit 6) and affidavit of counsel (Exhibit 7). The gravamen of 
the motion was that the court unreasonably restricted the scope of the search for information 
concerning the adoption case so as to render it meaningless. Accompanying these documents was 
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amotion for order to show cause as to why the Adoption Center of Choice ("the agency") should not 
divulge the identifying information of the adoptive parents. This is attached as Exhibit 8. 
6. The court denied the motion that same day, and suggested in its denial that Mr. 
Osborne subpoena the information from the agency. Minute entry (Exhibit 9). 
7. Mr. Osborne accepted the court's suggestion and served a subpoena upon the 
agency in order to secure the identities of the adoptive parents so that they might be served with a 
copy of the petition. The agency was not a named party in the petition. A copy of the subpoena is 
attached as Exhibit 10. 
8. The agency filed a motion to quash, supported by a memorandum. A copy of the 
motion is attached as Exhibit 11, and a copy of the memorandum is attached as Exhibit 12. Mr. 
Osborne responded in a hearing convened in two days after the agency's response was filed. Minutes 
of Hearing on Motion to Quash (Exhibit 13). Mr. Osborne also filed a supplemental memorandum, 
which advised the court of a recent ruling concerning the limits of personal jurisdiction. That 
supplemental memorandum expressly stated that Mr. Osborne did not at that point raise a personal 
jurisdiction challenge, but that the court should be aware of the limits of personal jurisdiction and 
how those limits favored Mr. Osborne's chances of prevailing. A copy of this memorandum is 
attached as Exhibit 14. The agency filed a response, (Exhibit 15), and Mr. Osborne replied (Exhibit 
16). 
9. The court ultimately granted the motion to quash. It opined in a memorandum 
decision (Exhibit 17) that the UCCJEA did not apply, and further opined that plaintiffs claims 
would be barred under the Utah Adoption Code, U.CA. § 78-30-1 et al, were he to challenge the 
adoption. The decision was entered on March 18,2002. 
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10. Osborne never raised the adoption code in his petition, but rather, in the course of 
attempting to quash the subpoena, the defendant Adoption Center of Choice raised the adoption code 
and Osborne's failure to comply therewith. Osborne never responded to the Adoption Center's 
challenge to plaintiffs legal rights under the adoption code, itbeing Osborne's consistent contention 
that an inquiry into the code's application to him was irrelevant. The Fourth Judicial District Court 
for Utah County issued dicta in the memorandum decision regarding the adoption code, dicta that 
clearly exceeded the narrow scope of the plaintiffs UCC JEA petition. Furthermore, the court's 
-ruling was not final, but was an-interim-ruling-regarding a-motion to quash a subpoena~served on~a 
nonparty. 
11. Because the UCC JEA petition was never served on a party, Mr. Osborne dismissed 
it under rule 41 on March 27,2002. A copy of the notice of dismissal is attached as Exhibit 18. The 
court subsequently signed an order quashing the subpoena on April 4,2002, the last action occurring 
in the case. The order is attached as Exhibit 19. 
12. On March 8, 2002, the Adoption Center of Choice filed a Petition for 
Determination of Birth Father's Rights with the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, case 
no. 022400054. A copy of this petition is attached hereto as Exhibit 20. 
13. Counsel for the Adoption Center sent a letter on March 11, 2002, to Phillip E. 
Lowry, counsel to Mr. Osborne in his UCC JEA petition. The letter requested that Mr. Lowry accept 
service on behalf of Mr. Osborne. The letter also stated that if service were not accepted "I will 
arrange for [Mr. Osborne] to receive notice." A copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit 21. 
14. Mr. Lowry refused to accept service and indicated to the Adoption Center in a letter 
dated March 15,2002, that it would have to serve Mr. Osborne personally with the petition, but that 
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Mr. Lowry did not believe that this was even possible given that Mr. Osborne was a North Carolina 
resident. A copy of this letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 22. 
15. Accompanying the petition filed by the Adoption Center of Choice was a Notice 
of Petition for Determination of Birth Father's Rights. This notice was directed to Frank Osborne 
care of Phillip Lowry, Esq. A copy of this notice is attached as Exhibit 23. 
16. No proof of service regarding the petition for determination of birth father's rights 
has ever been copied to Mr. Lowry, nor has any service been attempted upon Mr. Osborne in North 
-Carolina of any court documentsrincluding the Adoption-Petition-or the Petition for Determination 
of Birth Father's Rights. In short, the agency's counsel misrepresented himself in his letter of March 
11,2002. 
17. On March 21, 2002, three days after the Memorandum Decision in the UCCJEA 
action, the agency filed with the Fourth Judicial District Court in case 022400054, a Motion to Allow 
Petition for Determination of Birth Father's Rights to Be Heard Without Notice. Filed on the same 
day was a Notice to Submit the said motion. A copy of the motion is attached as Exhibit 24, the 
supporting memorandum is attached as Exhibit 25, and a copy of the notice to submit is attached as 
Exhibit 26. 
18. The same day, March 21, 2002, the agency filed a Motion to Grant Petition for 
Determination of Birth Father's Rights. Once again, the agency contemporaneously filed a Notice 
to Submit this motion. A copy of the motion is attached as Exhibit 27, and a copy of the notice to 
submit is attached as Exhibit 28. 
19. Neither of the motions nor notices to submit were copied to either Mr. Osborne or 
his counsel, as reflected in the mailing certificates attached thereto. 
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20. Six days later, on March 27,2002, without having received any input whatsoever 
from Mr. Osborne, the Fourth Judicial District Court issued a memorandum decision in case 
022400054, in which he granted the agency's motion to have the pending petition heard ex parte. 
A copy of this memorandum decision is attached as Exhibit 29. This memorandum decision was 
not sent to Mr. Osborne or his counsel. 
21. On April 8,2002, the court executed in case 022400054 an Order Granting Motion 
to Allow Petition for Deteimination of Birth Father's Rights to Be Heard without Notice, which was 
an order of memorializing the findings_and conclusions made in the memorandum Tlecisioii regarding 
the ex parte nature of the proceedings. A copy of this order is attached as Exhibit 30. The next day, 
on April 9, 2002, the court issued an Order regarding Birth Father's Rights, which declared 
affirmatively that Mr. Osborne had no rights with respect to the pending Utah adoption. A copy of 
this order is attached as Exhibit 31. 
22. Neither of these orders were sent to Mr. Osborne or his counsel. 
23. On April 4,2002, Mr. Osborne filed with the United States District Court of Utah 
an action challenging the constitutionality of Utah's construction of the Utah adoption code, 
specifically, the statutory law and case law that provided that any appearance whatsoever to intervene 
in or challenge a pending Utah adoption would subject the intervener or challenger to personal 
jurisdiction in Utah and to the application of Utah law. Mr. Osborne requested a declaration from 
the federal court that such a scheme deprived him of due process. A copy of the federal complaint 
is attached as Exhibit 32. 
24. Mr. Osborne's counsel first received notice of the April 8,2002, order in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court of Utah (the one that allowed determination of his parental rights ex parte) 
when he received a copy of it hi the mail on June 10,2002. It was attached to the agency's motion 
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for summary judgment in the federal judicial proceeding. Lowry Federal Affidavit attached hereto 
as Exhibit 33. 
25. On June 18, 2002, Mr. Osborne filed a motion for a temporary restraining order 
in the federal proceeding to enjoin the agency in the adoptive parents from finalizing the adoption. 
The finalization window would close on July 6,2002, and with it would close the revocability of the 
adoption process. Copies of the motion for temporary restraining order and the memorandum 
supporting the motion are attached as Exhibits 34 and 35. 
-26. On-June 21,-2002,-the Federal District-Court-conducted a hearing on the temporary 
restraining order and declined to issue the order based on concerns over the relationship between 
federal and state courts. No written record of this denial of relief has yet been generated, hence, none 
has been included in the record attached hereto. 
REASONS WHY NO OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY, OR ADEQUATE REMEDY EXISTS 
AND WHY A WRIT SHOULD ISSUE 
There are two components to the relief that Mr. Osborne seeks. The first has to do with an 
immediate crisis: on July 6,2002, the adoptive parents in this matter may proceed with finalization 
of the adoption. Under the Utah Adoption Code, an adoption, once finalized, is absolutely 
irrevocable and uncontestable. U.C.A. § 78-30-4.16(3). Thus, when six months have elapsed, no 
contest to the adoption will be possible, hi this respect Mr. Osborne is a victim of time, and the 
defendants are beneficiaries of delay. That is, unless the adoption finalization is enjoined by this 
Court. 
The second component has to do with why Mr. Osborne has such a difficult time even 
crossing the threshold of the Utah courthouse. As the law currently stands, if Mr. Osborne attempts 
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to seek relief to stay the adoption proceeding, he will be deemed to waive his best defense: that as 
a North Carolina resident, Utah law simply does not apply to him. 
WHY IT IS IMPRACTICAL OR INAPPROPRIATE TO FILE THIS WRIT IN THE 
DISTRICT COURT 
As noted in the statement of facts above, the Fourth Judicial District Court has already 
opined that it cannot compel the clerk of any other court to conduct a search of its records so as to 
allow Mr. Osborne to intervene in any pending adoption of Kenneth Slcyler Baker IE. The only other 
-practical wayto-secure'the information needed to'properly'intefvenerand to~s l^ife~thFrdentity^of 
the adoptive parents so an order enjoining finalizing could be served, and therefore be effective, 
would be to file separate actions in every county of the state, and hope that everyjudge would agree 
that it would be appropriate to search the docket of his or her district in the county. This would all 
have to be done before July 6,2002. This is clearly an absurd approach, and one that does not serve, 
nor secure, justice. Furtliermore, only a decree firom this Court regarding the nature of the special 
appearance Mr. Osborne should commence will grant him sufficient safe harbor to proceed. 
DATED this 21st dav of June, 2002. 
HOWARD, LEWIS ^PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand-delivered to the 
following this 21st day of June, 2002. 
Larry S. Jenkins, Esq. 
Wood Crapo, LLC 
60 East South Temple, #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
AFTOKMEY 2 0 
J:\PEL\osborne ca petition wnt.wpd 
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PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 






Our File No. 
Attomevs for Petitioner Frank Osborne 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, m, 
A Minor Child. 
VERIFIED PETITION 
CHALLENGING SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION UNDER UTAH CODE 
ANN. SECTION 78-45c-109 
Case No. r v ? P 4 D 0 t e £ ^ 
Judge ^G£S2l_ 
Division # -—) 
Petitioner Frank Osborne here files this petition with the Court challenging its subject 
matter jurisdiction to enter a custody determination/adoption decree over petitioner's son, Kenneth 
Skyler Baker, ffi. This petition is brought under the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Enforcement Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-101, et al. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Petitioner is a resident of Gaston County, North Carolina. 
2. There are three potential respondents to this petition. The first is the Adoption 
Center of Choice, a Utah corporation whose principal place of business is in Utah County, Utah. The 
other two respondents are the adoptive parents, whose identity is unknown, but who are believed to 
be Utah residents. 
3. On November 19,2000, petitioner met .Angela Baker, the birth mother. Petitioner 
struck up a relationship with Angela Baker and at the end of November, 2000, petitioner moved into 
Ms. Baker's home. 
4. At this time, Ms. Baker had a two-year-old son, D.J. Petitioner developed a 
parental relationship with D J. that has persisted to the present date. 
5. On December 10, 2000, Ms. Baker informed petitioner that she was pregnant. 
Petitioner resolved at that time to provide for the new child and regarded the new child, Ms. Baker 
and Ms. Baker's son, D.J., as a family unit for which he was responsible. 
6. On January 12,2001, petitioner bought anew home located at 1201 Alberto Lane 
in Stanley, North Carolina. Petitioner moved into this home along with Ms. Baker and D.J. At this 
point, petitioner's relationship with D.J. matured to the point that D.J. called petitioner "Dad." 
7. In February, 2001, Ms. Baker was instructed by her doctor to be on bed rest 
because her pregnancy was regarded by her physician as being high risk. She followed the doctor's 
instructions and continued to live in the home Mr. Osborne has purchased. 
8. Mr. Osborne maintained the home and provided for Ms. Baker and D. J. Ms. Baker 
was not employed during the pregnancy from February forward. 
9. Ms. Baker continued to live in petitioner's home through July, 2001. It was during 
this month that Ms. Baker first called an adoption agency called An Act of Love. Petitioner 
discovered that she had made contact with the adoption agency and expressed his disapproval. Ms. 
Baker represented at that point that she would not place the baby for adoption and attributed her 
actions to the fact that her psychiatric medications were apparently not woridng properly. Later that 
night, she checked herself into the local mental health center uttering suicide threats. 
n 
17. Thanksgiving 2001 was celebrated with Ms. Baker's family. Petitioner cooked and 
prepared the Thanks giving meal. This was at Ms. Baker's family's residence in Stanley, North 
Carolina. 
18. In early December, 2001, in an effort to rectify the fact that the child was not 
named after petitioner, petitioner twice secured a blank Affidavit for Voluntary Declaration of 
Paternity for execution under North Carolina law. Ms. Baker signed both of these documents but 
then became distressed and ripped the documents up in front of petitioner. 
19. During the month of December, 2001, petitioner and Ms. Baker's relationship 
deteriorated. Even so, petitioner and Ms. Baker continued to cohabit in the petitioner's home, and 
petitioner continued to provide for Ms. Baker, D.J. and the baby. 
20. On December 10, 2001, the relationship deteriorated to the point that Ms. Baker 
took DJ . and the baby and moved out of the house and took many of the possessions of both Ms. 
Baker and the petitioner with her. 
21. On December 15, 2001, Ms. Baker contacted the petitioner's mother and asked if 
she could take the baby to the hospital for an ear infection and respiratory distress. She also 
indicated that she needed those items that she was accustomed to the petitioner providing (diapers, 
gas drops, formula, etc.). Petitioner complied with these requests. 
22. On December 28, 2001, Ms. Baker came to petitioner's home and picked up 
Christmas presents that had been purchased by the petitioner for both D.J. and for the baby. 
23. December 28,2001, was the last time that the petitioner has seen the baby, hi early 
January, 2002, he received a call from Ms. Baker, and she left a message on his answering machine 
stating that she was going to Utah, and that he "had no chance in hell" of getting him back because 
the petitioner could not fight the State of Utah and could not win there. 
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attached as Exhibit A. The address of the court is Clerk of Superior Court, Att'n: Civil. P.O. Box 
340, Gastonia, N.C. 28053, and the telephone number for the court is (704) S52-3100. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Challenge to Subject Matter Jurisdiction) 
31. Petitioner incorporates previous allegations of this petition consistent with this 
count. 
32. The governing law in this matter is Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-101, et al., otherwise 
known as the Utah Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act. 
33. The Act provides for specific remedies in instances where custody of a child 
transported between states is at issue. 
34. Adoption proceedings are specifically covered under the provisions of the Act and 
under the applicable precedent of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
35. Specifically, the code defines a child custody proceeding as a proceeding in which 
legal custody, physical custody or parent-time with respect to a child is at issue, including a 
proceeding for a divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination 
of parental rights, and protection from the domestic violence in which the issue may appear. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45c-l02(4). 
36. The code differentiates between a child's home state and states that are not the 
child's home state. A home state is defined as a state in which a child lived with a parent or a person 
acting as a parent for at least consecutive months. In the case of a child less than six months of age, 
the term means the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45c-102(7). 
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since shortly after the child's birth. (Petitioner also alleges, infra, that no valid proceeding has been 
commenced, save the petition for paternity filed in North Carolina, because of several violations of 
Utah law). 
40. Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-204, a court of this state has temporary emergency 
jurisdiction if a child is present in the state and it is "necessary in an emergency" to protect the child 
because of actual or threatened mistreatment or abuse. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-204(l). These 
facts do not apply in this case. 
41. Even were this Court to find that it could exercise temporary emergency 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-204(l), that jurisdiction is both "temporary" and 
"emergency." Accordingly, the code provides that this Court may exercise jurisdiction only until 
such time as an order is obtained from the child's home state regarding custody. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45c-204(2). 
42. Withrespectto actions that have not yet been reduced to order but are still pending, 
the code provides that a court of this state that has been asked to make a child custody determination 
under the temporary emergency jurisdiction provision, upon being informed that a child custody 
proceeding has been commenced, shall immediately communicate with the other court. If this Court 
determines it has temporary emergency jurisdiction, Petitioner here requests that the Court 
immediately contact the North Carolina court in Case No. 02-CvD-478 (address and phone number 
above) for purposes of resolving any emergency the Court may define as existent, to protect the 
safety of the parties (including the petitioner) and the child, and to otherwise make findings and 
conclusions with respect to the duration of any temporary custody order this Court may deem it has 
jurisdiction to issue pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-204. The communication requirement 
is stated in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-204(4). (Nonetheless, petitioner here reiterates and contends 
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indisputable facts reveal a plot by the natural mother and adoption agency that is, at best, unseemly 
and, at worst, illegal. 
46. For these reasons, the Court should deem the adoption petition as filed in bad faith 
in that the conduct of the adoption agency and the adoptive parents is unjustifiable and, therefore, 
should decline to exercise jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-208. 
47. The custody proceeding at issue in this matter (namely, the adoption petition which 
this petition collaterally attacks) is further void and of no effect as to the petitioner because the 
petitioner received no notice thereof nor was served with proceed therein. The Utah Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act contains specific notice provisions regarding custody 
determinations. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-205. The code specifically states that "this chapter does 
not govern the enforceability of a child custody determination made without notice and an 
opportunity to be heard." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-205(2). 
48. The custody proceeding at issue in this matter (namely, the adoption petition which 
this petition collaterally attacks) is further void and of no effect because of the respondents' failure 
to comply with the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children, adopted by Utah at U.C.A. § 
62A-4a-701. The North Carolina Compact Administrator has officially protested the violation of 
the Compact (a copy of the protest is attached as Exhibit B). Such a violation constitutes a violation 
of the laws of the State of Utah, and renders void the filing of the adoption petition in question. 
49. Section 78-45c-308 of the code allows for expedited enforcement of child custody 
determinations. Petitioner here requests that the Court immediately schedule a hearing on the issue 
of whether it has jurisdiction over custody of this child. The code specifically states that the hearing 
in question shall be held on the next judicial day following the service or process, unless that date 
is impossible. In that event, the Court shall hold the hearing on the first day possible. Petitioner here 
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WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for relief as follows: 
1. That the adoption file in this matter to be opened so as to effect service on the 
respondents and to investigate the pending proceedings; 
2. That this court declare that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the pending 
adoption proceeding, or that it decline to exercise jurisdiction; 
3. That upon finding it has no jurisdiction or that it declines jurisdiction, that it 
communicate this result to the Superior Court of Gaston County, North Carolina, 
so that that court may make an appropriate determination of custody over the child; 
4. That upon such court reaching a custody determination (whether such custody be 
vested in an individual or the North Carolina Department of Social Services, and 
whether it be temporary or permanent), that this Court vest such determination 
with full faith and credit after proper registration of the North Carolina court order 
in the State of Utah, and this Court at that time enforce said order by issuing such 
writs as it deems proper, including a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to the Utah 
UCCJEA. 
DATED this / r day of February, 2002. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne 
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STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 02-CvD- 4S& 
Gaston County in The General Cour Of JJS^C 
^] District , Supenor Covn Divs 
l/Vflmc Of Plaintiff 
! Frank Edward Osborne , J r . 
Adorass 





Name Of DafendanMst 
Angela C a t h e r i n e Baker 
I I Alias end Piunes Summons 
Dale LBS! Summons Issued 
To Each Of The Defendant^) Named Below: 
Mama And Addrasi Of Datanaanl 1 
Angela Catherine Baker 
9711 Wlllllyxi Une 
Charlotte, NC 28214 
Nome A no Address 0/ Dafanoant 2 
A Civil Action Has Been Commenced Against Youi 
You Bre notified to appear and answer the complaint of the plaintiff as follows 
1 Serve a copy of your written enswer to the complaint upon the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney within thirty [, 
days after you have been served. You may serve your answer by delivering a copy to the plaintiff or by ma 
to the plaintiff's last known address, Bnd 
2 File the original of the written answer with the Clerk of Superior Court of the county named above. 
If you fail to answer the complaint, the plaintiff will apply to the Court for the relief demanded in the complaini 
Nmmm And Addntas Of PtmintlfT a Attorn my ftf Nona. Aoormaa Of Plaintiff) 
Richard B. Schultz 
P. 0. Box 1232 
Gaatonia, North Carolina 2B053 




Deputy CSC Assistant CSC I Civr* Of Suoerw 
• ENDORSEMENT 
This Summons was originally ISBued on the date 
indicated above and returned not served. At the 
request of the plaintiff, the time within which this 
Summons must be served Is extended thirty (30) 
days. 
N O T E T O P A R T I E S : Many countlas hava MANDATORY ARBITRATION programs m which most cases where the amount in conirovt 
SI 5,000 or lass are hoard by on arbitrator before a WBI The parties will be notified if this case *s assigned for 
arbitration, and, if so, what procedure is TO be followed 
AOC CV .100 
(Over) 
2001, said minor child resided with the Defendant and the 
Defendant's m o t h e r at 12214 Sherman D r i v e , Charlotte, North 
Carolina* that from August 16, 2 0 0 1 , until December 10, 2001, 
said minor ohild reeided with tho P l a i n t i f f , the Defendant and 
the D e f e n d a n t ' * m o t h e r at 1201 A l b e r t o Lane, Stanley, North 
Carolinaj that on Deoember 1 0 , 2 0 0 1 , said minor child and the 
Plaintiff want to the residence of the P l a i n t i f f ' s mother at 3600 
Enfield Road, C h a r l o t t e , North C a r o l i n a : that on December 11, 
2001, the D e f e n d a n t took said minor child to reside at the 
residence of the D e f e n d a n t ' s g r a n d m o t h e r at 5631 Candlcwood 
Drive, C h a r l o t t e , North Carolinaj that said minor child continued 
to reside with the D e f e n d a n t at said r e s i d e n c e until on or about 
January 4, 2 0 0 2 , w h e n , upon i n f o r m a t i o n and belief, the Defendant 
once again took eaid minor ohild to the State of Utah, uhere the 
Defendant, upon I n f o r m a t i o n and b e l i e f , arranged to give said 
minor child up for a d o p t i o n , w i t h o u t the consent of tho 
Plaintiff• 
7. There have been no prior a c t i o n s in this or any other 
Juriediction c o n c e r n i n g the custody of said minor child, eave and 
except for one or m o r e domestic v i o l e n c e aotlone filed in 2001 in 
either M e c k l e n b u r g County and/or G a s t o n County, North Carolina, 
between the P l a i n t i f f and the D e f e n d a n t , wherein temporary 
custody of eaid m i n o r child was sought by the D e f e n d a n t . 
8. The P l a i n t i f f knowe of no one other than the Defendant 
who ie a real party in i n t e r e s t c o n c e r n i n g the custody of said 
minor ohild. 
9. The P l a i n t i f f ie a fit and p r o p e r person to have the 
primary care, c u s t o d y , tuition and c o n t r o l of said minor child of 
the parties* 
10. It would be c o n s i s t e n t with the boot interests of said 
minor ohild of the parties to bo in the primary custody of the 
P l a i n t i f f . 
11. For a v a r i e t y of r e a s o n s , the D e f e n d a n t ie not a fit 
and proper pereon to have the cuetody of said minor child, most 
demonstrably by n a e o n of the fact that the D e f e n d a n t has oought 
to have no further r e l a t i o n e h i p with said minor ohild by giving 
•aid minor child up for a d o p t i o n in the State of Utah. 
1 2 . E x c e p t for the fact that said m i n o r child was actually 
born in the State of Utah and that tho D e f e n d a n t approximately 
one month ago took iiaid minor ohild to the State of Utah to be 
given up for a d o p t i o n , neither party has any significant 
connection with the State of U t a h . 
13* It would be o o n o i e t e n t with the bout interests of oaid 
minor ohild for the P l a i n t i f f l © p a t e r n i t y of eaid minor child to 
be c o n c l u s i v e l y e s t a b l i s h e d via g e n e t i c t e s t i n g . 
NORTH CAROLINA 
GASTON COUNTY 
V E R I F I C * T I O N 
V 
FRANK EDUARD OSBORNE, JR., being first duly ©uorn, 
depoeae and (ays that he is the Plaintiff in tho foregoing 
Complaint, and that at tuch ha hat read the oontinti thtraof and 
knowe the came to be true and correct of his oun knowledge, save 
and except a e to t h o * a mattere therein alleged upon information 
and belief, and as to thoee thingi, he belieyaa tbjHq to be true 
C^ FRANK EDUARD OSBORNE, JR 
'^Hft^'O^S0 flnc* subscribed before me 
, •«./>, '\ 
t h i c s t j f # \ T d ay o f F e b r u a r y , 2002 , 
T A
 * *\wi 
/ A R Y P U B L I C 
»«WiyM,.C»ortmie8ion E x p i r e e : ^ - / ^ 7 
GASTON COUNTY 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
Children & Family Services 
330 N. Marietta St. 
Gastonia, North Carolina 28052 
(704) 862-7530 (704) 862-7898 - FAX Keith A. Moon 
Director 
01-23-3002 
North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services 
Divisionpof Social Services - Interstate Adoptions 
325 N. Salisbury St. 
2411 Mail Service Center 
Raleigh,i:NC 27699-2411 
Attn: Linda Wrightson 
Interstate Adoption Consultant 
Re: Cjjiild - Kenneth Skyler Baker (born 08-06-2001) 
Mother - Angela Catherine Wilkinson Baker 
Father - Franklin Edward Osborne 
Dear Ms|i wrightson: 
We wou(ti like to make you aware of a potential adoption situation which we feel 
falls within the jurisdiction of the Interstate Compact yet we are not aware of any 
attemptsjat compliance. This case involves a North Carolina mother and child. In 
the past jjnonth the mother took the child to Utah where she relinquished him for 
adoptionjito The Adoption Center of Choice. Upon doing so, she returned to North 
Carolina. The birth father here had been very involved with the mother and child. 
Howeverjishe did not notify'him of her plans to surrender the child nor has the 
agency iijj Utah involved him in the planning. 
It is our 
ensure 
Contention that both mother and child have North Carolina residency thus to 
safety and well being of the child, Interstate Services are needed. ttte 
In order po give you insight into this matter, we are providing a detailed written 
report oq! the situation as It was brought to our attention. The birth mother is a legal 
resident Of Mecklenburg County, NC and the birth father resides in Gaston County, 
NC. 





Angela C. Baker 
6331 Candlewood Dr. 
Charlotte, NC 28210 
Franklin E. Osborne 
1201 Alberto Lane 
Stanley, NC 28164 
Our agency has had a number of contacts in January 2002 from a Gaston County 
resident]! Frank Osborne, vyho Is concerned over the fact that earlier this month, his 
ex-girlfri|nd, Angela Baker, took their infant son to Utah without his knowledge or 
consent and relinquished him for adoption. Mr. Osborne was in need of direction 
and guidance. He stats hei loves his son and does not agree with a plan of adoption. 
We havejencouraged him to contact an attorney about pursuing this legally. At the 
sametiniie, we have some Questions about how this potential adoption Is being 
handled land about the need for ICPC intervention and jurisdiction. 
In order p determine the situation and circumstances that led to this point, we 
asked Mij. Osborne to provide us a chronology of his relationship with Ms. Baker 
from thejjtime of Skyier's conception to the present and of how this relinquishment 
in Utah qame to be. 
The following narrative documents what we have been advised in a series of 
interviews. 
Summary: 
Frank Osborne and Angela 3aker had an established boyfriend/girlfriend relationship 
when thejy moved In together in 2000; this residence was in Mecklenburg County. It 
was dunfflg this time of cohabitation that she became pregnant. 
Mr, Osborne, looking towards the future, purchased his current home in Gaston 
County, rtjC. He and a pregnant Angela Baker moved in during January 2001, 
They remained together throughout the pregnancy until just before the child was 
born. 
•* 
Apparerkly some sort of restraining order was also issued pending a hearing 
becaus4iM5. Baker continued to live in Mr. Osborne's Gaston County home with the 
baby wriflle Mr.Osborne stayed with his mother in Charlotte. 
They never reunited as a couple following the December 2001 break up but were 
able to Establish some level of rapport. On at least five different dates between 
December 12 and 23, she brought Skyler to visit Mr. Osborne. She was then living 




jjscheduled to bring Skyler to visit Mr. Osborne on December 28. However 
him to cancel stating there had been a death in the family so she had to 
fjer plans; Caller ID showed this call was made from her grandmother's 
Mecklenpurg County, NC home. 
lldd 
The nextj information Mr.Osborne received regarding his son came from a mutual 
friend who called on 01-05-2002 to inform him that Ms. Baker had gone to Utah and 
surrendered Skyler for adoption to an agency there. Desperate, Mr. Osborne and 
his mother made multiple calls to Utah trying to locate her and/or the agency 
involved 
Finally on] 01-06-2002 theyjfound the motel where she stayed while surrendering 
Skyler but were told she had just checked out. On 01-07-2002, they saw her here 
in North Carolina. She is staying at her grandmother's home in Charlotte, NC. 
ji 
Mr. Osbcfne last saw her approximately 01-20-2002 when the two were in court 
regarding charges they had taken out. These were dismissed. Apparently both 
parties have taken out assarted charges on each other. All but one taken out by Ms. 
Baker agjjinst Mr. Osborne have been dismissed and that one is not scheduled for a 






assistance and a lot of persistence, Mr. Osborne located the adoption 
yoived in this surrender - The Adoption Center of Choice in Orem, Utah. 
V officials there told him he essentially had no parental rights and was 
(of three" possibilities as the birth father. They have initiated no efforts to 
involve him at any time in the planning for his son. 
When wejiquizzed him about the paternity issue, he stated he has no doubts that he 
is the father of Skyler. He was living with Angela Baker before conception, at 
conceptiojp, and until the end of the pregnancy. He said she was not involved with 
other merfj during that time and has said this now in an effort to hamper his ability 
to stop thie adoption. 
Frank Osrjorne states he is committed to providing for his son and does not want 
him placejjl for adoption. Mr, Osborne's mother has expressed her support for her 
son's effoirts, her love for her grandson, and her willingness to help in any way. 
5 
Carolinafiand signed paternity affidavits naming Frank Osborne as his birth father 
with no iother possibilities named. 
Therefore we feel that the;placement of this child across state lines for adoption, 
whiles ^gal option for the mother, Is a matter that falls within the jurisdiction of the 
Interstate Compact for Placement of Children since Skyler is a North Carolina 
residentiivlth planned placement in Utah. 
We ask that the North Carolina ICPC office pursue this to insure legal compliance, 
protectidh of all parties' rights, and the well being of Kenneth Skyler Baker. 
Prepared; bv: 
Patricia l|| Hovis 
Social Wflrk Supervisor I I I 
Gaston Clbunty Department of Social Services Adoption Program 
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HOWARD. LEWIS & PETERSEN 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, IE, 
A Minor Child. 
| MEMORANDUM DECISION 
| Case No. 0204026^-
| Date: March 18, 2002 
| Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Before the Court is a Motion to Quash Subpoena filed by Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. 
("Adoption Center"). The Court, having heard oral argument, and reviewed and considered all 
relevant memoranda, including the supplemental memoranda filed while this Motion was under 
advisement, now grants Adoption Center's Motion. 
FACTS 
1. Adoption Center is an adoption agency licensed by the State of Utah. 
2. On or about January 4, 2002, Angela Baker relinquished her son, Kenneth Skyler Baker, 
to Adoption Center xo be placed for adoption in Utah. 
3. Kenneth was born in Utah on August 6, 2001. His birth certificate lists no father, only 
Angela as the birth mother. 
4. On January 15, 2002, Angela Baker's husband, Donny Baker, who is not the birth father 
but is the legal father, gave written consent to Kenneth's placement for adoption. 
5. Frank Osborne, a resident of the State of North Carolina and petitioner in this action, 
claims to be Kenneth's birth father. Osborne commenced a paternity and custody action in North 
Carolina on February 11, 2002. 
6. Kenneth was placed with a family for adoption sometime previous to February 11, 2002. 
7. On February 14, 2002, Osborne filed a verified petition challenging subject matter 
jurisdiction of the Court in this matter, along with an ex parte motion to open the adoption file, 
and a motion for order to show cause. 
8. This Court granted the ex parte motion in part on February 15, 2002. The Court ordered 
the adoption file opened, but only if the file could be identified through a search of Court records. 
Osborne has apparently been unable to identify the adoption file. 
9. The Court declined to grant Osborne an order requiring Adoption Center to disclose the 
identities of the adoptive parents and denied Osborne's motion to reconsider the ex parte order of 
February 15. 
10. On February 21, 2002, Osborne served Adoption Center with a subpoena seeking 
disclosure of the identities of the adoptive parents, the attorneys involved in the filing of the 
adoption petition, the county in which the petition was filed, the names of any judges who have 
issued rulings or orders in the case, and the case number of the file. 
11. On February 26, 2002, Adoption Center responded with this Motion to Quash Subpoena. 
ANALYSIS AND RULING 
Adoption Center argues that it should be protected from subpoena for the following 
reasons. First, the identities of the adoptive parents of Kenneth are protected and confidential 
under the regulations governing state licensed child-placement agencies. Second, assuming Frank 
Osborne is Kenneth's biological father, he has completely waived any right that he might have 
with respect to Kenneth under the Utah code. Third, Adoption Center asserts that because the 
adoption of Kenneth is not final, Adoption Center still has legal custody and control of Kenneth, 
and Osborne does not need the identities of the adoptive parents to protect his interests. 
The Court concludes that Adoption Center's analysis of the applicable law is accurate. 
Child placing agencies are required to treat all adoption records as confidential, and "[n]o 
information [should] be shared with any person without the appropriate consent forms." Utah 
Admin. Code § R501-7-4(A)(15) (2002). Because these records are confidential and protected by 
law, the Court must quash or modify any subpoena requiring disclosure when no exception or 
waiver applies. UtahR Civ. Pro. 45(c)(3)(A)(iii) (2001). The court concludes that Osborne has 
not articulated any waiver or exception that should apply in this case. 
Further, Frank Osborne has not complied with the legal requirements for preserving his 
parental rights under Utah law. The legislature has established the standard that must be met by 
an unmarried biological father to preserve his rights, stating very clearly that "[he] is presumed to 
know that the child may be adopted without his consent unless he strictly complies with the 
provisions of [Utah Code Title 78, Chapter 30], manifests a prompt and full commitment to his 
parental responsibilities, and establishes paternity." Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(3)(e) (2001). 
If the unmarried biological father does not strictly comply with the statutory requirements, he "is 
deemed to have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the child . . . and his consent to 
the adoption of the child is not required." § 78-30-4.14(5). When a child is under six months old 
and placed for adoption, as Kenneth was, the biological father must (1) initiate paternity 
proceedings in accordance with the Code, (2) file notice of the paternity proceedings with the 
state registrar of vital statistics, and (3) if he had actual knowledge of the pregnancy, pay a fair 
and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred during the pregnancy and birth. § 78-30-
4.14(2)(b). All of the requirements must be met "prior to the time the mother executes her 
consent for adoption or relinquishes the child to a licensed child-placing agency." Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted these statutory requirements in In re Adoption of 
B.B.D., 984 P.2d 967 (Utah 1999). The facts of In re B.B.D. are strikingly similar to the current 
case, and this Court finds that the principles of that case apply squarely here as well. The father in 
that case "failed to take any action to establish paternity according to [Utah's] statutory scheme," 
id. at 971, and so waived and surrendered any right he had to his child. Similarly, Frank Osborne 
did not comply with the first two requirements of filing for paternity and filing proper notice of 
the action with the state of Utah. Angela Baker relinquished her child to Adoption Center on or 
about January 4, and Osborne did not file a paternity action until February 11 in North Carolina. 
He has still not filed an action in Utah, aside from his petition challenging the jurisdiction of the 
Court. Osborne has failed to take any action according to the statutory requirements, and so has 
waived any right to Kenneth he may have otherwise had. Having so waived those rights, the 
Court concludes that the information Osborne seeks by the subpoena is of no worth to Mr. 
Osborne. 
Adoption Center makes the additional point that it stands as the legal custodian of 
Kenneth from the date his mother relinquished him until the time the adoption is finalized. This 
assertion is correct according to Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-4.22, which states that the child-
placing agency has "custody and control" during that period of time. Osborne can assert his 
interests directly against Adoption Center and has no need to discover the identities of Kenneth's 
adoptive parents. 
In oral argument before the court, Osborne attempted to show that the Utah Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-101 to 
318, applied to deny the Court jurisdiction over the matter before it. In making that argument, 
Osborne seemed to be attempting to bifurcate the definition of an "adoption proceeding" into two 
separate actions, one a child custody action and the other an action to terminate the parental 
rights of the natural parents. However, to make the argument that the UCCJEA applies to the 
current proceedings with regard to Kenneth's adoption, Osborne must somehow circumvent § 78-
45c-103, which clearly states: "This chapter [the UCCJEA] does not govern: (1) an adoption 
proceeding . . . ." The Court does not agree with Osborne that these proceedings regarding 
Kenneth's adoption should properly be construed as anything but an "adoption proceeding" in the 
plain language of the statute. The UCCJEA does not apply here, as evidenced by its plain 
language. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the Court concludes that the subpoena of Adoption Center should be 
quashed. Adoption Center has a legal duty to keep the contents of the adoption file, including the 
names of the adoptive parents, confidential. Because the adoption file is legally protected, the 
Court is required to quash or modify any subpoena of its contents absent any exception or waiver. 
Osborne, having not strictly complied with the Utah adoption statutes, has not preserved any of 
his rights with respect to Kenneth under Utah law, and cannot show good cause why the file 
should be opened when he is free to proceed directly against Adoption Center. Therefore, 
Adoption Center's Motion to Quash Subpoena is granted for the reasons stated above. 
Adoption Center's counsel is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it 
for the Court's signature. 
DATED this / £ day of U^A.
 f, 2002, 
BY THE COURT 
'* court^ 
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Case No. OZd^OOb^ 
Date: February 19, 2002 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
Before the Court is Petitioner's Motion for Order to Show Cause Re: Respondent 
Adoption Center of Choice. The Court having conferred with another Judge in this District as per 
Petitioner's request, now denies Petitioner's Motion. The Court concludes that the most efficient 
way to obtain the desired information is through a subpoena duces tecum. Petitioner will then be 
entitled to all remedies available under the law if the Agency fails to comply with the subpoena. 
DATED this [lY^- day of [^ftO-iM 2002 
r*VjJL/Ar 
rAV'***^%feY THE COURT 
\$mUDlA LAYCOCK, 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, m , 
A Minor Child. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
02&r-CaseNo. 0204 
Date: March 18, 2002 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Before the Court is a Motion to Quash Subpoena filed by Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. 
("Adoption Center"). The Court, having heard oral argument, and reviewed and considered all 
relevant memoranda, including the supplemental memoranda filed while this Motion was under 
advisement, now grants Adoption Center's Motion. 
FACTS 
1. Adoption Center is an adoption agency licensed by the State of Utah. 
2. On or about January 4, 2002, Angela Baker relinquished her son, -Kenneth Skyler Baker, 
to Adoption Center to be placed for adoption in Utah. 
3. Kenneth was born in Utah on August 6, 2001. His birth certificate lists no father, only 
Angela as the birth mother. 
4. On January 15, 2002, Angela Baker's husband, Donny Baker, who is not the birth father 
but is the legal father, gave written consent to Kenneth's placement for adoption. 
5. Frank Osborne, a resident of the State of North Carolina and petitioner in this action, 
claims to be Kenneth's birth father. Osborne commenced a paternity and custody action in North 
Carolina on February 11, 2002. 
6. Kenneth was placed with a family for adoption sometime previous to February 11, 2002. 
7. On February 14, 2002, Osborne filed a verified petition challenging subject matter 
jurisdiction of the Court in this matter, along with an ex parte motion to open the adoption file, 
and a motion for order to show cause 
8 This Court granted the ex parte motion in part on February 15, 2002 The Court ordered 
the adoption file opened, but only if the file could be identified through a search of Court records 
Osborne has apparently been unable to identify the adoption file 
9. The Court declined to grant Osborne an order requiring Adoption Center to disclose the 
identities of the adoptive parents and denied Osborne's motion to reconsider the ex parte order of 
February 15. 
10 On February 21, 2002, Osborne served Adoption Center with a subpoena seeking 
disclosure of the identities of the adoptive parents, the attorneys involved in the filing of the 
adoption petition, the county in which the petition was filed, the names of any judges who have 
issued rulings or orders in the case, and the case number of the file 
11. On February 26, 2002, Adoption Center responded with this Motion to Quash Subpoena. 
ANALYSIS AND RULING 
Adoption Center argues that it should be protected from subpoena for the following 
reasons First, the identities of the adoptive parents of Kenneth are protected and confidential 
under the regulations governing state licensed child-placement agencies Second, assuming Frank 
Osborne is Kenneth's biological father, he has completely waived any right that he might have 
with respect to Kenneth under the Utah code Third, Adoption Center asserts that because the 
adoption of Kenneth is not final, Adoption Center still has legal custody and control of Kenneth, 
and Osborne does not need the identities of the adoptive parents to protect his interests 
The Court concludes that Adoption Center's analysis of the applicable law is accurate 
Child placing agencies are required to treat all adoption records as confidential, and u[n]o 
information [should] be shared with any person without the appropriate consent forms " Utah 
Admin. Code § R501-7-4(A)(15) (2002) Because these records are confidential and protected by 
law, the Court must quash or modify any subpoena requiring disclosure when no exception or 
waiver applies Utah R. C/v. Pro 45(c)(3)(A)(iii) (2001) The court concludes that Osborne has 
not articulated any waiver or exception that should apply in this case 
Further, Frank Osborne has not complied with the legal requirements for preserving his 
parental rights under Utah law. The legislature has established the standard that must be met by 
an unmarried biological father to preserve his rights, stating very clearly that "[he] is presumed to 
know that the child may be adopted without his consent unless he strictly complies with the 
provisions of [Utah Code Title 78, Chapter 30], manifests a prompt and full commitment to his 
parental responsibilities, and establishes paternity." Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(3)(e) (2001). 
If the unmarried biological father does not strictly comply with the statutory requirements, he "is 
deemed to have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the child . . . and his consent to 
the adoption of the child is not required." § 78-30-4.14(5). When a child is under six months old 
and placed for adoption, as Kenneth was, the biological father must (1) initiate paternity 
proceedings in accordance with the Code, (2) file notice of the paternity proceedings with the 
state registrar of vital statistics, and (3) if he had actual knowledge of the pregnancy, pay a fair 
and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred during the pregnancy and birth. § 78-30-
4.14(2)(b). All of the requirements must be met "prior to the time the mother executes her 
consent for adoption or relinquishes the child to a licensed child-placing agency." Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted these statutory requirements in In re Adoption of 
B.B.D., 984 P.2d 967 (Utah 1999). The facts of Zw re B.B.D. are strikingly similar to the current 
case, and this Court finds that the principles of that case apply squarely here as well. The father in 
that case "failed to take any action to establish paternity according to [Utah's] statutory scheme," 
id. at 971, and so waived and surrendered any right he had to his child. Similarly, Frank Osborne 
did not comply with the first two requirements of filing for paternity and filing proper notice of 
the action with the state of Utah. Angela Baker relinquished her child to Adoption Center on or 
about January 4, and Osborne did not file a paternity action until February 11 in North Carolina. 
He has still not filed an action in Utah, aside from his petition challenging the jurisdiction of the 
Court. Osborne has failed to take any action according to the statutory requirements, and so has 
waived any right to Kenneth he may have otherwise had. Having so waived those rights, the 
Court concludes that the information Osborne seeks by the subpoena is of no worth to Mr. 
Osborne. 
Adoption Center makes the additional point that it stands as the legal custodian of 
Kenneth from the date his mother relinquished him until the time the adoption is finalized. This 
assertion is correct according to Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-4.22, which states that the child-
placing agency has "custody and control" during that period of time. Osborne can assert his 
interests directly against Adoption Center and has no need to discover the identities of Kenneth's 
adoptive parents. 
In oral argument before the court, Osborne attempted to show that the Utah Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-101 to 
318, applied to deny the Court jurisdiction over the matter before it. In making that argument, 
Osborne seemed to be attempting to bifurcate the definition of an "adoption proceeding" into two 
separate actions, one a child custody action and the other an action to terminate the parental 
rights of the natural parents. However, to make the argument that the UCCJEA applies to the 
current proceedings with regard to Kenneth's adoption, Osborne must somehow circumvent § 78-
45c-103, which clearly states: "This chapter [the UCCJEA] does not govern: (1) an adoption 
proceeding . . . ." The Court does not agree with Osborne that these proceedings regarding 
Kenneth's adoption should properly be construed as anything but an "adoption proceeding" in the 
plain language of the statute. The UCCJEA does not apply here, as evidenced by its plain 
language. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the Court concludes that the subpoena of Adoption Center should be 
quashed. Adoption Center has a legal duty to keep the contents of the adoption file, including the 
names of the adoptive parents, confidential. Because the adoption file is legally protected, the 
Court is required to quash or modify any subpoena of its contents absent any exception or waiver. 
Osborne, having not strictly complied with the Utah adoption statutes, has not preserved any of 
his rights with respect to Kenneth under Utah law, and cannot show good cause why the file 
should be opened when he is free to proceed directly against Adoption Center. Therefore, 
Adoption Center's Motion to Quash Subpoena is granted for the reasons stated above 
Adoption Center's counsel is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it 
for the Court's signature 
DATED this / £ day of jfrLCCA. 2002, 
BY THE COURT 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 020400623 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail PHILLIP E LOWRY 
ATTORNEY PET 
12 0 EAST 3 00 NORTH 
PO BOX 1248 
PROVO, UT 84603 
Mail LARRY JENKINS 
ATTY 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 E South Temple 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Dated this ft day of fAqrr^ 20 02 
ifttT) sJL 
TI33T Deputy Court 
Page 1 (last) 
MIUPT 
Z0S2 li/.R 2 1 P 12: H'rtjp 
PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile. (801) 377-4991 
j:\pel\osbome notice, dis 
Our File No. 26,372 
Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, m, 
A Minor Child. 
NOTICE OF DISMISSAL 
CaseNo.020400623 
Judge Hansen 
Pursuant to Rule 41(a)l, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner herein files this Notice 
of Dismissal of his petition. 
DATED this 27th day of March, 2002. 
PHmjP/]BrL6l^Yv4ar: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following, 
postage prepaid, this day of March, 2002. 
Larry S. Jenkins, Esq. 
Wood & Crapo 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84603 
SECRETARY 
» s« 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Larry S. Jenkins (4854) 
Richard J. Armstrong (7461) 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-6060 
Attorneys for The Adoption Center of Choice 
;ourt 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IS AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, III, 
A Minor Child. 
ORDER QUASHING SUBPOENA 
Probate No. 020400623 
Judge Hansen 
Third-party Adoption Center of Choice, Inc.'s ("Adoption Center") motion to 
quash subpoena came on for hearing on March 1,2002. Adoption Center was represented by 
Larry S. Jenkins, and petitioner was represented by Phillip E. Lowry. The Court heard argument 
and took the matter under advisement. Now, after reviewing the memoranda submitted by the 
parties, and the pleadings and papers on file, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court is of 
the opinion that the motion to quash should be GRANTED. Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that Adoption Center's motion to quash the subpoena issued on 
February 21,2002, and served on Adoption Center on February 22,2002 (the "Subpoena"), is 
GRANTED; and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Subpoena is hereby QUASHED. 
DATED this _^fday of M^ch, 2002. 
BY THE COURT. 
Stev£nJ<J3ankki—J 
Fourth Distnct Court Judge 
H^^ 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h e ^ day of March, 2002, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER QUASHING SUBPOENA was mailed in the U.S. Mail, first-class 
postage prepaid, to: 
Phillip E. Lowry 
Howard, Lewis & Peterson, P-.C. 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo,Utah 84603 
Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne 
S:\WPDATA\PLEADING\ADOPTION CENTER.ORDER ON MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA.wpd 
3 
RICHARD L EVANS 
PAMELA B. HUNSAKER 
SHERIA MOWER 
STEPHEN G. WOOD 
JOI GARDNER PEARSON 
OF COUNSEL 
KAR 1 k 2002 
HOWARD, LEWIS 4 PETERSEN 
Phillip E. Lowry 
Howard, Lewis & Peterson, P.C. 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo,Utah 84603 
Re: In re Kenneth Skyler Baker, III 
Dear Phil: 
I received your letter and supplemental memorandum. Having reviewed the case 
you cite, it does not appear that it applies to the proceeding you filed or to the adoption of the 
child. Consequently, Adoption Center of Choice will not comply with your demand. 
Friday, we filed a separate proceeding under Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.24 and 
the Declaratory Judgment Act to obtain a determination of your client's rights. I have enclosed a 
copy of that petition, along with a notice of the petition and an acceptance of service. I think the 
personal jurisdiction issue may be best raised by your client in this new matter because it would 
eliminate the question of the applicability of the UCCJEA to adoption proceedings. Please let 
me know as soon as possible if you cannot accept service for your client and I will arrange for 
him to receive notice. 
Sincerely, 
Larry S. Jenkins 
W O O D L.RAPO LLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
MARY ANNE Q WOOD
 5 0 0 E A G L £ G A T £ T O W E R 
DAVID J. CRAPO 
LARRY S JENKINS 60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
DARRYLJ. LEE SALT LAKE ClTY, UTAH 8 4 1 1 1 
KAIHRYN OGDEN BALMFORTH 
G.TROY PARKINSON FACSIMILE (801) 366-6061 
March 11,2002 
cc: James Webb 
Jackson Howard 
Don R. Petersen 
Craig M. Snyder 
JohnL. Valentine 
D. David Lambert 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
Post Office Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
E-Mail; Last name First initial@hlpattorneys.com 
[Example: HowardJ@hlpattorneys.com] 
File No. 26,372 
March 15,2002 
Phillip E. Lowry 
Kenneth Parkinson 
Helen H. Anderson 
Sean M. Petersen 
Douglas W. Finch 
OF COUNSEL 
S. Rex Lewis 
Sent Via Facsimile No. 801-366-6060 
Larry S. Jenkins, Esq. 
Wood Crapo, LLC 
60 East South Temple, #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
I received your letter today. Sorry to hear about your conclusion. My reply will include some 
treatise references. Perhaps that will assist your analysis. 
As far as your petition is concerned, Utah has no personal jurisdiction over my client, so he 
cannot be served with it. I invite you to attempt to do so. (B B D. does not apply here). 1, of course, 
will not accept service, merely being enlisted to challenge jurisdiction in the other proceeding. 
Inasmuch as your client has been burned very badly in the past in attempts to avoid the requirements 
of due process over natural fathers, I am sure you will advise them to proceed with the utmost 
caution. If you attempt to secure judicial approval for service, I trust you will not attempt to do so 
ex parte, as has been done in the past. That, as they say, would be very bad. 
In any event, I see your petition as failing for lack of jurisdiction. Perhaps we should 
concentrate on the instant dispute that is perfected before the court instead of what is in my opinion 
a jurisdiction!ess goose chase. 
I trust you see that my client is in earnest. This will be a long road. 
Thank you for your time. I will be in touch with my reply very soon. 
Very truly yours, 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Phillip E. Lowry 
PEL/mc 
J:\PEIAOSBORNE 
Fourth judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of uiah 
' Z-la-nf^— .Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, m, 
A Minor Child. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 022400054 
Date: March 27, 2002 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Before the Court is Petitioner Adoption Center of Choice's Motion to Allow Petition for 
Determination of Birth Father's Rights to Be Heard Without Notice. The Court, having reviewed 
and considered Petitioner's memorandum, now grants Petitioner's Motion. 
FACTS 
1. Adoption Center of Choice ("Adoption Center") is an adoption agency licensed by the 
State of Utah. 
2. On August 6, 2002, A.B. gave birth in Utah to a baby boy known as Kenneth Skyler 
Baker, HI. 
3. On January 4, 2002, A.B. relinquished Kenneth to Adoption Center to be placed for 
adoption in Utah. Adoption Center has since placed Kenneth for adoption. 
4. On January 15, 2002, A.B.'s husband, who is not the birth father but is the legal father, 
gave written consent to Kenneth's placement for adoption. 
5. Frank Osborne, a resident of the State of North Carolina, claims to be Kenneth's birth 
father. Osborne has filed a verified petition challenging subject matter jurisdiction of the Court in 
this matter. 
6. Adoption Center conducted several searches through the state registrar of vital statistics 
to ascertain whether anyone had filed notice of the initiation of paternity proceedings. As of 
February 27, 2002, no one, including Osborne, had filed paternity proceedings in Utah. 
ANALYSIS AND RULING 
Adoption Center is seeking an order of the Court that notice of the determination of birth 
father's rights is not required to be served on the putative birth father, Frank Osborne. Adoption 
Center argues that Osborne has failed to preserve any right he may have had to the child under the 
Utah adoption statute. 
When a child is placed for adoption, the requirements for an unmarried birth father to 
preserve his right to notice under the Utah adoption statute are as follows: (1) he must initiate 
paternity proceedings in accordance with the Utah Code, and (2) he must file notice of the 
paternity proceedings with the state registrar of vital statistics. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-
4.13(2)(b) (2001). Both of the requirements must be met "prior to the mother's execution of 
consent or her relinquishment to an agency." § 78-30-4.13(3)(a). 
The legislature has stated very clearly that "[a]n unmarried biological father, by virtue of 
the fact that he has engaged in a sexual relationship with a woman, is deemed to be on notice that 
. . . and adoption proceeding . . . may occur, and has a duty to protect his own rights and 
interests." § 78-30-4.13(1). If the unmarried biological father does not strictly comply with the 
statutory requirements, he "is deemed to have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the 
child, including the right to notice of any judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of 
the child, and his consent to the adoption of the child is not required." § 78-30-4.14(5). 
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted the adoption statute requirements in In re Adoption 
ofB.B.D., 984 P.2d 967 (Utah 1999). This Court finds that the principles articulated by In re 
B.B.D. apply squarely here as well. The father in that case "failed to take any action to establish 
paternity according to [Utah's] statutory scheme," id. at 971, and so waived and surrendered any 
right he had to his child. Osborne has similarly not complied with the legal requirements for 
preserving his parental rights under Utah law, and so is not entitled to notice of the petition for 
determination of birth father's rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court concludes that because Osborne has not met the strict requirements of the Utah 
adoption statutes for preserving his rights, he is not entitled to notice of the petition for 
determination of birth father's rights. Therefore, Adoption Center's Motion is granted. 
Petitioner's counsel is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it for the 
Court's signature. 
DATED this "2ff day of. 
BY THE COURT . ^ R ; - , 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I c e r t i f y t h a t a copy of t h e a t t a c h e d document was s e n t t o t h e 
f o l l o w i n g p e o p l e f o r c a s e 022400054 by t h e method and on t h e d a t e 
s p e c i f i e d . 
METHOD NAME 
Mail LARRY S JENKINS 
ATTORNEY PET 
500 EAGLE GATE TOWER 
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Dated this 1r-\ day of Wlqir,iA 20 fl£ 
i£2& , J-ifffl 
Deputy Courrt c l e r k ?fe 
PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801)377-4991 
Our File No. 26,372 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 




ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE, a 
Utah Corporation, JOHN DOE and JANE 
DOE, Adoptive Parents, 
Respondents. 
AFFIDAVIT OF SANDRA BRIDGES 
Case No. 20020489 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF GASTON ) 
SANDRA BRIDGES, being duly sworn, states: 
1. I am the step-mother of Frank Osborne, the plaintiff herein. 
2. I have retained on my answering machine messages left on Frank's behalf from the 
birth mother, Angela Baker. The messages are dated December 30,2001, January 3,2002, January 
8, 2002, and January 10, 2002. 
3. On June 24,002,1 participated in atelephone conversation with Frank's attorney, Mr. 
JLK-2S-2032 10'51 -OUWD LEU IS and r€TE°SEN 
Phillip Lowry Attached hereto as Exhibit A is an accurate transcription of that telephone 
conversation, and attached hereto as exhibit Bis a true and actual recording of the conversation The 
conversation contained a replaying of the phone messages I referred to above. 
DATED thufw^dav of June, 2002. 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this^-^faav of June, 2002. 
SY PUBLIC rs^/rs^ NCTAR1 
*%> 
DATED t h i s ^ g g ^ day of June, 2002 
PHILLIP E. LOWRY, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys fox Petitioner Frank Osborne 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage pre-paid, 
to the following this 2^" day of June, 2002. 
Larry S. Jenkins, Esq. 
Wood Crapo, LLC 
60 East South Temple, #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
•1 
ATTORNEY 
J:\PEL\OSBORNE BRIDGES SANDRA.AFF 
Phillip Lowry's conversation with Sandra Bridges, June 24, 2002. 
Mr. Lowiy: This is Phillip Lowry. I am having a conversation with Sandi'a Bridges. Would you 
please identify yourself, Ms. Bridges? 
Ms. Bridges: Yes, Sandra Bridges. 
Mr. Lowiy: Are you related to the petitioner in the current case pending in the Court of Appeals, 
Frank Osborne? 
Ms. Bridges: Yes, he is my stepson. 
Mr. Lowiy: Have you ever taken messages for Mi*. Osborne at your home in the past? 
Ms. Bridges: Yes. 
Mr. Lowry: Were those messages left on your answering machine? 
Ms. Bridges: Yes they were, some of them were. 
Mr. Lowry: Is one of those messages the subject of the original UCCJEA Petition that Mr. Osbome 
signed? 
Ms. Bridges: Yes. 
Mr. Lowry: And is it a message concerning that Frank would "Have no chance in Hell" of getting 
the baby back in Utah? 
Ms. Bridges: Yes. 
Mr. Lowiy: Do you still have the recordings of those messages? 
Ms. Bridges: I have one recording of that message, yes. 
Mr. Lowiy: And are there other messages that preceded that message? 
Ms. Bridges: Yes. In order to get to that one, you have to hear the others. 
Mr. Lowry: How many are there? 
Ms. Bridges: There are three. 
Mr. Lowry: Before the fourth one? 
Ms. Bridges: Right, before you get to the fourth one, yes. 
Mr. Lowry: Ok. Can you tell me the dates those messages were left? 
Ms. Bridges: Yes. One was on December 30, Saturday; January 3, Thursday; January 8, Tuesday; 
January 10, Thursday. 
Mr. Lowry: Now how do you know those days of the week? 
Ms. Bridges: Well, I know that they're right because right after Christmas and she even mentions 
Christmas. I keep an address log book on a message book. I know they are right. 
Mr. Lowry: Does the answering machine actually state the days of the week the messages were left? 
Ms. Bridges: Yes they do. 
Mr. Lowry: Do those tags occur at the beginning or at the end of the messages? 
Ms. Bridges: At the end. 
Mr. Lowry: Ok. Can you play me those four messages now straight through? 
Ms. Bridges: Yes. 
Messagel: You have 19 old messages. Hey Sandie, this is Angela. I hope y'all had a good 
Christmas, [unintelligible]. I guess I'll be able to talk to you tomorrow. I need some things for the 
baby and I wondered if y' all would be willing to get em. If not, that's fine, I'll sell some of Frank's 
tools and go get em. Just give me a call tomorrow and we'll work it out. However, he's gettin real 
low on clothes and the clothes that he got for Christmas is stuff that he can't use for 3 or 4 more 
months. I need to take the [unintelligible] now and I've probably got about 5 more days and I will 
need more diapers & stuff. Just give me a call and tell me what you want to do. Bye. Saturday, 
8:03 p.m. 
Message 2: Y'all need to quit fuckin with me about these tools. When my grandmother gets 
her six grand, you know what I'm fuckin' talking about Frank. You'll get your Goddamn tools. 
Thursday, 9:34p.m. 
Message 3:1 just want you guys to know something that car* was mine before I even left for 
Utah. Thank God for my grandmother's church. Thursday, 11:58p.m. 
Message 4: [unintelligible] Frank's got back together with me so y'all could try to get the 
baby in his name. I wouldn't do that cuz I didn't know who the father was. And it makes all perfect 
sense now why he would want to get back together with it being so bad. And you know what the 
truth is? I got all this stuff recorded. And y'all are not gonna win. You all can't fight the State of 
Utah. And you aint got a chance in fuckin' hell. That baby is supposed to be with a family that 
loves him and he won't be j erked around in a bunch of bull shit. That you have [unintelligible]. You 
know what? You are so fucked up. Bye. Thursday, 10:36 a.m. 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUST%E 









ANGELA CATHERINE BAKER, 
ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE, 
INC., JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE, 
DEFENDANT 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 
This matter coming on before the undersigned presiding Judge of the Civil District Court, 
upon Plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order herein; from an examination of 
the file materials, the presentation of counsel, the verified pleadings filed herein, and 
other evidence presented, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact: 
1. Plaintiff is a citizen of Gaston County, North Carolina. 
2. Defendant corporation is a Utah corporation, organized and operating in Orem, 
Utah, and advertising on the Internet and soliciting in all states for children for its 
adoption services. 
3. Plaintiff alleges that he is the natural father of the minor child Kenneth Osborne, 
although paternity has not yet been established by judicial proceeding.. 
Plaintiff alleges: that he lived together with defendant Angela Baker in Stanley, 
Gaston County, for more than six months and up to the date of the birth of the 
child Kenneth Osborne; Plaintiff and Angela Baker have never been married and, 
on the date of the birth of the child, Angela Baker was married to another man, 
who has released any right or interest in the minor child; that, just prior to the 
birth of the child, Angela Baker went to the state of Utah, for reasons which were 
unknown to the Plaintiff; that, immediately after giving birth to the child on 
August 6, 2001, Angela Baker returned to the state of North Carolina, arriving 
there on August 9, 2001.; that Angela Baker resided with plaintiff, the minor 
child, and other persons at the places and upon the dates described in the 
Complaint herein, until January 4, 2002. Ms. Baker upon information and belief 
ihen took the child again to the state of Utah, there to give the child up for 
adoption via Defendant corporation's agency; that, thereafter, Plaintiff filed this 
action in Gaston County, North Carolina, pursuant to the North Carolina Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act, GS 50A et seq., on February 11, 2002. 
5. Jurisdiction in this matter, pursuant to the UCCJA, vests in the state of North 
Carolina as follows: 
50A-201. Initial child-custody jurisdiction. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in G.S. 50A-204, a court of this State 
has jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination only if: 
(1) This State is the home state of the child on the date 
of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home 
state of the child within six months before the 
commencement of the proceeding, and the child is absent 
from this State but a parent or person acting as a 
parent continues to live in this State; 
(2) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction 
under subdivision (1), or a court of the home state of 
the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the 
ground that this State is the more appropriate forum 
under G.S. 50A-207 or G.S. 50A-208, and: 
a. The child and the child's parents, or the child and 
at least one parent or a person acting as a 
parent, have a significant connection with this 
State other than mere physical presence; and 
b. Substantial evidence is available in this State 
concerning the child's care, protection, training, 
and personal relationships; 
(3) All courts having jurisdiction under subdivision (1) or 
(2) have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the 
ground that a court of this State is the more 
appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child 
under G.S. 50A-207 or G.S, 50A-208; or 
(4) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction 
under the criteria specified in subdivision (1), (2), 
or (3). 
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(b) Subsection (a) is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child-
custody determination by a court of this State. 
(c) Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child 
is not necessary or sufficient to make a child-custody determination. 
6. That this Gaston County action is presently pending, Plaintiff having effected 
service and an entry of default having been made in the absence of a filed answer. 
7. Plaintiff alleges that, while he is now aware of the intentions of Angela Baker, he 
remains unaware of: the present status of the presumptive Utah adoption 
proceeding; the location of the court in which such an action is located; and the 
names of the potential adoptive parents (defendants Doe herein.). 
8. While Utah law has no provision for special appearances, Plaintiff has endeavored 
through several Utah venues to challenge the jurisdiction of the Utah courts; to 
enjoin the adoption proceeding; and to obtain, by subpoena and otherwise, the 
names of the adoptive parents, in order to facilitate obtaining the above 
information. Citing confidentially provisions and the requirements of Utah law, 
Defendant corporation has successfully opposed the disclosure. 
9. Jurisdiction appears to be in North Carolina under the provisions of the UCCJA, 
which applies to this situation. 
10. Plaintiff alleges that Utah law further provides for a period of custody of the child 
with the adoptive parents, that being six months, after which the adoption 
proceedings may then become final. Upon information and belief this period is 
about to expire, with the result that a final order of adoption may immediately 
issue. 
11. The Court has before it no evidence of compliance with the provisions of the 
Interstate Compact for Placement of Children. 
12. Plaintiff requests the issuance of a temporary restraining order and injunctive 
relief against The Adoption Center of Choice Inc. in going forward with this 
matter, in order to prevent the foreclosure of the parental rights of the Plaintiff 
while this case proceeds. 
13. That this proceeding,-and any orders resulting therefrom, should be given full 
faith and credit by the Utah courts. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes Conclusions of Law as 
follows: 
1. That the Court has jurisdiction over the nature and pendency of this action. 
2. That irreparable harm would result, were this Temporary Restraining Order not to 
issue, in that the rights of the Plaintiff herein may be permanently affected by the 
entry of a final determination of the status of the minor child prior to the hearing 
of this matter by a court of appropriate jurisdiction. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court hereby 
orders as follows: 
1. That The Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. be and is ordered to refrain from taking 
any steps to further prosecute or perfect any Utah court proceeding affecting 
Plaintiffs parental rights, specifically any adoption proceeding now pending and 
involving the minor child Kenneth Osborne (case number and other identifying 
information unknown). 
2. That a hearing concerning continued injunctive relief shall beheld in Courtroom 
3 j l ° f t h e Gaston County Courthouse on July ^  2002 
3. That Plaintiff herein shall post a bond with the Clerk of Court of Gaston County, 
North Carolina in the amount of %3MK&> 
:OPY 
. COURT 
Issued this the ^ f day of July, 2002, at && _p. m 
Judge Dennis Redwing 
District Court Judge Presiding . 
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PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Our File No. 26,372 
Attorneys for Petitioner 




ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE, a 
Utah Corporation, J. S. and S. S., 
Adoptive Parents, 
MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING 
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO 
CORRECT AND SUPPLEMENT HIS 
CERTIORARI PETITION WITH 
FACTS ARISING OUT OF THE 
NORTH CAROLINA PROCEEDINGS 
Case No. 20020515-SC 
Plaintiff Frank Osborne ("Osborne") has filed a Motion to Correct and Supplement his 
Petition for Certiorari with information just received from the North Carolina court. 
The Petitioner's motion concerns the receipt on August 12,2002, of a copy of a Preliminary 
Injunction by the General Court of Justice, District Court Division, Gaston County, North Carolina, 
case 02CvD 478. That Injunction enjoins the Adoption Center of Choice from proceeding with 
finalization of the adoption at issue in this matter. A copy of this order is attached as Exhibit A. 
Also attached as Exhibit B is a letter sent to the North Carolina court by the Adoption Center's 
counsel defending the issue of granting the injunction on the merits. This constitutes a general 
appearance by the Adoption Center, and validates the North Carolina court's conclusion that it has 
jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the person in issuing its Injunction. 
The detailed opinion of the North Carolina court betrays the graveness of the matter as 
viewed by that State. This is yet additional grounds for this Court to consider the matter on 
certiorari. 
This memorandum contains the pith of the supplementation and correction requested. Thus, 
in lieu of submitting pages to be inserted, Petitioner requests that the Court incorporate the contents 
of this memorandum by reference into the body of the Petition should it grant the motion to correct 
and supplement. Accordingly, ten copies of this memorandum and exhibits are submitted for the 
Court's consideration. 
DATED this 13th day of August, 2002. 
/
 PHILLIP E . l 5 ^ x ) f o r : 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 





I hereby certify that p true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following, 
postage prepaid, this ID day of August, 2002. 
Larry S. Jenkins, Esq. 
Wood Crapo, LLC 
60 East South Temple, #500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Adoptive Parents J.S. and S.S 
3430 Charlesworth Circle 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
ATTORNEY 
J:\PEL\osborne memo motion cert correction and to supplement.wpd 
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STATE OK NORTII CAROLINA TN-"»$ GENERAL COURT OF JI 'SI ICE 
COUNTY 01- GASTON 2M J<)> - - DI-STRIC r COURT DIVISION 
?A
' ^,1 fo&vD 478 
J M ' 
FRANK OSBORNE, '} ' "•i-1-




ANGELA C ATI1ERINE BAKER, ) 
ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE, ) 
INC., JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE, ) PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Dlil'ENDANT ) 
This matter corning on before the undersigned presiding Judge of the Civil District Court, 
after the granting of a temporary restraining order pursuant to Rule 65 of the North 
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, and upon application for a Preliminary Injunction 
herein; from an examination of the file materials, the presentation of counsel the verified 
pleadings filed herein, and other evidence presented, the Court makes the following 
Findings of Fact: 
1. That the Findings of Fact contained in the Temporary Restraining Orriei issued 
previously are incorporated herein by reference as if fully set out hcrcm. 
2: The Court acknowledges that it has considered the full record of proceedings in 
the Utah Courts, as per the Record on Appeal submitted to the Utah appellate 
court, before issuing this Injunction, and in fact had considered trr.isc materials 
before issuing the Temporary Restraining Order in the case. 
3. The Court further acknowledges receipt of a letter dated July 3, 2002, from 
attorney Larry Jenkins, representing the Adoption Center of Choice. Inc., and 
enclosing three exhibits: a Memorandum Decision regarding the quashing of a 
subpoena; an Order regarding Birth Father's Rights; and an Order riled July 2, 
2001 and entered by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
4. The materials submitted and decided through the Utah courts appear to make t\u> 
central points. The first is that Plaintiff herein has failed to assert certain rights (or 
^perhaps more appropriately, responsibilities) under Utah law which, under this 
factual situation, appear to have accrued and been waived before Plaintiff had any 
knowledge of the need to assert them, and therefore that Plaintiff has lost those 
"rights". The second asserts that Plaintiff ''cannot simply stand on the sidelines 
and claim that the Utah courts lack jurisdiction over him". Opinion at page 3. 
5. While this Court does not attempt to reach any conclusion regarding LUah law, it 
does conclude that such a consideration is unnecessary and inappropriate. The 
UCCJEA appears to be directly applicable io this situation as relates to North 
Carolina law; under that act, Plaintiff herein appears to have made a prima facie 
showing that North Carolina is the *'home state" of the child as defined therein. 
While Defendant points out that the UCCJLA does not apply to adoption 
proceedings, there is no such proceeding involved in North Carolina, and 
exclusive, original jurisdiction is conferred in North Carolina under ihc statute. 
This jurisdiction must not and should not be abrogated by a proceeding in another 
Stale which would render these proceedings moot. 
6. It appears that this case is governed by Interstate Compact on the Placement of 
Children, NCOS 110-57.1 et seq, and thai the Compact has in no way been 
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complied with, as Compact supervisor Patricia Hovis indicates in her letter, 
contained in the appellate record. 
In a factually similar case. 
When the Compact is read in its entirety, it is apparent thai Article 
Vlli(a) contemplates the exclusion from the operation of the Compact of 
the sending of a child by a parent, relative, or guardian who possesses the 
full legal right to plan for the welfare of the child, see Hartiield, 68 Neb. 
L Rev. at 311, and simply leaving the child with a relative or nonagency 
guardian in another state. The plain meaning of the phrase "and leaving 
the child with" in Article VHI(a) contemplates an arrangement made for 
care of the child of a family character, and does not encompass placement 
of the child for adoption, which the provisions of the Compact expressly 
govern. Even if plaintiffs are "nonagency guardians" as they contend, 
because the record establishes tliat defendants sent the child to plaintiffs in 
North Carolina as a preliminary to a possible adoption by plaintiffs, and 
did not simply ffleav[e] the child with" plaintiffs, we reject plaintiffs' 
argument that Article VIII(a) excludes the instant case from the operation 
of the Compact 
[2] Plaintiffs argue that defendants are not the "sending agency" as that 
term is used in the Compact, and thus the retention of jurisdiction 
provisions do not apply to defendants. We disagree. 
The Compact defines the term "sending agency" as 
a party state officer or employee thereof; a 
subdivision of a party state, or officer or 
employee thereof; a court of a party state; a 
person, corporation, association, charitable 
agency or other entity which sends, 
brings, or causes to be sent or.brought 
any child to another party state. 
N.C.G.S. 110-57.1, art. 11(b) (1991) (emphasis added). "The definition of 
sending agency is broad enough to include any individual or entity, 
including a parent. . . , that causes a child to be moved interstate.11 
llartfield, 68 Neb. L. Rev. at 309. The.Compact in pertinent part provides 
that, prior to sending any child into a receiving state as a preliminary to a 
possible adoption, the sending agency shall furnish the appropriate public 
authority in the receiving state (which in North Carolina i> the Department 
of Human Resources, see id. art. 11(c)) with written notice ol'ibe intention 
to send the child into the receiving state. Id. art. 111(b). The ('ompact 
further provides that 
ft]he sending agency shall retain jurisdiction 
over the child sufficient to determine all 
matters in relation to the custody, 
supervision, care, treatment and disposition 
of the child which it would have had if the 
child had remained in the sending agency's 
state, until the child is adopted 
Such jurisdiction shall also include the power 
to effect or cause the return of the child or 
its transfer to another location and custody 
pursuant to law. 
Id. art. V(a) (emphasis added). 
Standi v. Brock (N.C. App>), 425 SU 2d 446 (1993), 
7. The Court dopes not address the applicability of the PKPA, the Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act, TO this situation,-as such an analysis is unnccessar> 
in view of the ruling of the Court. 
8. The court reaffirms the findings made in the Temporary Restraining Order herein 
without duplicating those findings. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes Conclusions of Law as 
follows: 
1-. That the Court has jurisdiction over the nature and pendency of this sciion. 
2. That irreparable harm would result, were this Injunction not to issue, in that 
rights of the Plaintiff herein may be permanently affected by the entry of a i 
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deteimination of the status of the minor child prior to the hearing of this matter by 
a court of appropriate jurisdiction. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conchisions of Law, the cou'i h;reby 
orders as follows: 
That, pending further orders of the Court, The Adoption Center of Choice, Inc., 
continues to be and is ordered to refrain from taking any steps to further prosecute or 
perfect any Utah court proceeding affecting Plaintiffs parental rights, specifically 
any adoption proceeding now pending and involving the minor child Kenneth 
Osborne (case number and other identifying information unknown). 
Issued this the J^ day of July, 2002. 
Judge Dennis Redwing 
District Court Judge Presiding . 
MARY ANN? Q WOOD 
DAV\DJ. CRAW 
LARRY S. JENKINS 
DAKRYI J. Lr.r 
KAIUHYN OC.DIN BAUHOKUI 
J/VMFi> W .SlhWVK'l 
RICHARD J. AKM^TRONO 
G. TROY PAWONSON 
"WOOD CRAPO
 m 
ATTORNEYS A! I AW 
500 FAG I 1- GATE T O W E R 
60 FAST S O U T H TEMPLE ;•" ' 
SALT LAW CITY, UTAH 84111 ° 
TFiF.PhONh (801) 366-6060 
FACMMHJ (BOD 166-6061
 m \ (UJ , ^ 
2 A) 0 4 
Tin M \KJ) 1 EVANS 
P A M C I A B . hUNbAHVR 
5HHJ A MU\MK 
STTPHCN G "WOOD 
Jf)i C.\KL»NEV PEAHSMN 
0» („ni N^EI 
July 3, 2002 
i?v Federal Express 
The Honorable Dehnis J. Redwing 
General Court^f Justice 
District Codrt Division 
Gastoiy£ounty Courthouse 
325 North Marietta Street 
G^stonia, North Carolina 28052 
Re: Osborne v. J3nter, c/ a/., Case No. 02 CvD 478 
Dear Judge Redv* ing: 
I represent Adoption Center of Choice, which apparently is a named defendant in 
the referenced action, but which has never been served. Today, I received in the mail a copy of 
a temporary restraining order your honor signed on July 1, 2002. I am not licensed in North 
Carolina, but while we attempt to retain counsel there, if that becomes necessary, 1 wanted to get 
in your hands copies of rulings courts in Utah have made concerning Mr. Osborne and the child 
at issue. I do not believe counsel for Mr. Osborne provided your honor with copies of these, or 
your decision on the temporary restraining order may have been different. It may be that Mr. 
Osborne's North Carolina counsel is not aware of these rulings. 
These documents are as follows: 
. 1. A March 18,2002 ruling by the Fourth District Court siltinji in Utah 
County, Uiah, that "Frank Osborne has not complied with the legal requirements Un preserving 
his parental rights under Utah law." Exhibit A at 3, which is a copy of the Memorandum 
Decision. Thai court also ruled that "Osborne has failed to lake any action according to the 
statutory requirements, and so has waived any right to Kenneth he may have olhervvi.se had.M Id. 
2 In that same Memorandum Decision, the Fourth District Court also titled 
that the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (fc4\ JCCJf.A"). i Itah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-45c- i 01 to 31 8, does not apply to "an adoption proceeding" and, then fore, the court 
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concluded thai the UCCJEA did not apply to the proceedings Mr. Osborne had brought before it 
Id. at 4. See Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-103. This is the same uniform act thai Mr Osborne used 
as the basis foi obtaining the temporary restraining order from your honor. I note that N.C. Gen. 
Stat. Ann. § 50A-1CH similarly provides that the UCCJEA ''does not govern an adoption 
proceeding 
? On or about April 8, 2002, the Fourth District Court entered an order 
finding that ^ny person claiming to be the putative father of Kenneth Baker, including Frank 
Osborne, twis deemed to have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the minor child. 
including the ri^ht to notice of any judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of the 
child, and his consent to the adoption of the child is not required." Exhibit B, which is a copy of 
the Order Regarding Birth Father's Rights entered by the Fourth District Court. 
4 On July 2, 2002, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled that "Petitioner [Frank 
Osborne] has simply failed to take any timely action to preserve his rights Lo this child." 
Exhibit C, which is a copy of the Order of the Utah Court of Appeals denying Mr. Osborne's 
petition for a writ of mandamus and temporary restraining order. 
1 believe it is important for your honor to have these court orders jnd rulings 
before making further decisions in this case. If any questions or issues can be resolved by 
conference call between your honor, Mr. Osborne's counsel, and mc, 1 am available July 5, 8. 
and 9. 
Thank you for considering these materials. 
Sincerely, 
Enclosures 
cc: Thomas H. Kakassy (with enclosures) 
FILED j , j l r - to 
Fourth Judicial District Cburt 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
_£^Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ADOPTION OF JJRV, 
a Minor. 
NORBERTO VAZQUEZ, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE, 
etal., 
Defendants. 
CASE NUMBER: 002400156 
DATED: NOVEMBER 7, 2000 
RULING 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFTELD, JUDGE 
This case is before the court on plaintiffs motions for writ of habeas corpus 
and for writ of mandamus. The matter was heard in a day-long evidentiary hearing 
on October 23, 2000, at which the birth mother, the birth father and the social 
worker with Adoption Center of Choice each testified.1 Having heard the evidence 
and the arguments of counsel, I now issue this ruling granting issuance of both 
1
 Each of these three witnesses flew to Utah to testify, the birth parents from Alabama and the 
social worker from Fresno, California, to which she has relocated following the incidents giving rise to 
this action. This travel underscores the point made hereafter, that it is curious that the Utah court was 




I find that the following facts have been proven by clear and convincing 
evidence:2 
1. A child was born on September 1, 1999, to Emily Shawnee Taylor 
("Emily") at UAB Hospital in Birmingham, Alabama. 
2. At the time of conception and at the time of delivery of the child, 
Emily was married to Larry Taylor ("Larry"). 
3. Though married, Emily and Larry were living separate from one 
another at the time of conception and at the time of delivery. 
4. Around the time of conception Emily was involved in an extra-
marital, sexual affair with Norberto Vazquez, Jr. ("Norberto"). 
5. Emily, Norberto and Larry each believed that the child born on 
September 1, 1999, was the child of Emily and Norberto, and that Larry was not a 
biological parent of the child. 
6. This belief was fueled by the fact that Larry had a vasectomy several 
years before Emily's conception in this case. 
2
 Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-406(3), decisions to terminate parental rights must be based 
upon clear and convincing evidence. In this case, because of the allegedly dire consequences which may 
flow from a ruling in favor of Norberto, I have evaluated the evidence by that standard. Arguably, that 
standard is unfair to Noiberto as it may place a heavier burden upon him than appropriate if he is 
seeking to set aside the termination of his parental rights. Because I am not now determining the merits 
of whether his termination should be set aside, only whether the parents must submit to the Utah court 
on this issue and whether they must be identified, and because I conclude Norberto meets the clear and 
convincing standard on the facts now before the court, my decision to use this standard of evidence 
results in no prejudice to either party. 
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7. Norberto was with Emily at the hospital at the time of delivery of the 
child. 
8. At the hospital the child was given the name of Jacob Josiah Rivera 
Vazquez, and that name was placed on the child's birth certificate. 
9. After delivery, an employee of the hospital assisted Emily in filling 
out the papers for the baby's birth certificate and the employee attempted to place 
Larry's name on the paper work as the birth father. 
10. Emily protested, asserting that the child was the son of Norberto and 
asked that Norberto's name be placed on the birth certificate as the father. 
11. The hospital employee said this could not be done because Emily 
was married to Larry. 
12. As a result of this disagreement, the child's birth certificate did not 
name any individual as father, neither Larry nor Norberto. 
13. After the delivery Emily moved into the home of Norberto with their 
child. 
14. After the child was born Emily lived with Norberto for two weeks. 
They had a fight and she moved out. Thereafter, until March 2000, Emily and the 
child lived with Norberto in a tumultuous, off-again, on-again relationship. 
15. During one of the periods when they were apart Emily began the 
process to change the child's last name to her maiden name, though she never 
completed the process and the child retained the surname of Vasquez. 
16. The child's social security card was issued in the name of Vasquez. 
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17. Every time that Emily moved out of Norberto's residence, after a 
few days he would go looking for her and for his child. He usually found her and 
persuaded her to move back in with him. 
18. In February 2000, after another fight with Emily, Norberto wanted 
to pick up his child for visitation but the police intervened. They would not allow 
his pick up of the child because Norberto's name was not on the birth certificate. 
19. As a result, since at least February 2000, Norberto has known that 
he had not been named on the birth certificate as the child's father. 
20. From the time of the child's birth until March 2000, Norberto 
provided fiinds for most of the child's daily needs, including funds to purchase a car 
seat, stroller, crib, clothes, diapers, formula and other needs. He also provided a 
significant share of the living expenses for Emily during that time. 
21. Norberto also bought Christmas gifts for the child for Christmas 
1999. 
22. In March 2000, Emily was again living with Norberto, but was 
greatly depressed. Larry had custody of her other children and she was living with 
Norberto and their son Jacob. 
23. While in that depressed state, Emily decided she wanted to adopt 
out her child, and she called an adoption agency listed in the local phone directory: 
Heart of Gold. 
24. Heart of Gold is a referring adoption agency located in California, 
and it referred Emily by telephone to Adoption Center of Choice located in Utah. 
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25. Ultimately, and without any discussion of the matter with Norberto 
with whom she was residing, Emily made arrangements to fly to Utah to place the 
child for adoption. 
26. On March 21, 2000, Emily called Norberto at his work and asked 
that after work he bring home some cigarettes and drinks from the store so that 
they could party that evening. 
27. Immediately thereafter she called a cab and went to the airport, 
where a ticket was waiting. 
28. She flew to Utah with the child. 
29. Emily spent almost two weeks in Utah where she was introduced to 
the proposed adoptive parents and she learned their names and identities. 
30 During all of that time she resided in a hotel paid for by the 
Adoption Center of Choice. 
31. On April 10, 2000, Emily signed a relinquishment and allowed Jacob 
to be placed with the proposed adoptive parents, who were residents of the State of 
Washington. 
32. The adoptive parents came to Utah to take physical custody of the 
child and thus submitted themselves to the laws of the State of Utah. 
33. During the process with the Adoption Center of Choice, the 
adoptive parents were advised that this adoption was a "high risk" adoption as the 
Adoption Center of Choice did not have any relinquishment or consent from the 
child's birth father, Norberto. 
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34. Notwithstanding that no consent or relinquishment had been 
obtained from Norberto, the adoptive parents took physical custody of the child and 
left the State of Utah for their home in Washington. 
35. No proceedings were commenced in Utah to terminate Norberto's 
parental rights until May 25, 2000, more than a month and a half after the adoptive 
parents took physical custody of the child. 
36. During all of that time, and since, the adoptive parents were aware 
of the risk that the natural father may have some claim to the child. 
37. The Adoption Center of Choice has informed the adoptive parents of 
this proceeding. 
38. There is no significant unfairness to the adoptive parents if their 
identities are disclosed to Norberto as they allowed their identities to be known to 
Emily. 
39. From the time that Emily left Norberto's home on March 21, 2000, 
until May 2000, Norberto had no idea where she was nor where his child was. He 
made several attempts to locate her, even contacting her husband Larry, and was 
told that nobody knew where she was. 
40. Unlike the other times when Emily had left his home, this time he 
could not find her or his child. 
41. During the process of the adoption, Emily told the Adoption Center 
of Choice that she did not know where Norberto lived, that she had heard from her 
family members that he had moved from the home where she had lived with him, 
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and that she did not know how to get in contact with him. 
42. These representations were presented in an affidavit which Emily 
signed and which was filed in this court in case number 002400120. 
43. These representations were false, as Emily knew that the trailer in 
which she had lived with Norberto was on a lot behind a home owned by his 
grandfather. She knew the address of the grandfather's home and reasonably knew 
that the grandfather would know how to contact Norberto. She also knew that in 
past instances when she moved out of Norberto's home, he had contacted her 
husband, Larry, looking for her, and she reasonably anticipated that he would do so 
on this occasion. 
44. Despite this knowledge, Emily did not tell the adoption center that 
the address on Adams Avenue where she had lived with Norberto was immediately 
behind and on the same lot as his grandfather's home. 
45. While in Utah Emily participated with the Adoption Center of 
Choice and its lawyers in proceedings to terminate Norberto's parental rights. 
46. The Adoption Center of Choice instituted the termination 
proceedings in case number 002400120. 
47. In that proceeding the Fourth District Court issued an order that 
terminated Norberto's parental rights, then ordered the file sealed. 
48. At the conclusion of the hearing giving rise to this ruling, I issued an 
order that the sealed file be unsealed. I have reviewed that file. 
49. The Adoption Center of Choice purported to give notice to 
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Norberto of the termination proceedings taking place in Utah by publishing notice 
of the Utah proceedings in the Alabama Messenger, a newspaper of general 
circulation in Jefferson County, Alabama, which is the county in which Norberto 
and Emily had lived together. 
50. The notice published in the Alabama Messenger was addressed to 
the "putative father of Jacob, who was born in Birmingham, Alabama on September 
1, 1999, to Emily Shawnee." 
51. This publication was not reasonably calculated to apprise Norberto 
of the Utah proceedings as the full name of Jacob, though known to Emily and the 
Adoption Center of Choice, was not used nor was Emily's full name used, only her 
first and middle names. 
52. Where Emily knew how to get in touch with members of Norberto's 
family, and in fact, knew that she had left his residence on Adams Avenue with his 
child on March 21, 2000, it was more likely that he could be found by attempting 
service at that address than by the published service in the newspaper. 
53. The Adoption Center of Choice also did a paternity search in Utah 
which indicated that nobody had filed a claim of paternity with the Utah 
Department of Health. This paternity search was not helpful nor probative as 
Norberto had no basis to have filed a claim of paternity in Utah. He had no notice 
nor idea that the child's mother had taken the child to Utah for the purpose of 
placing the child for adoption. 
54. On May 25, 2000, the Adoption Center of Choice filed its action to 
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terminate Norberto's parental rights. 
55. That same day judge of this court signed an order terminating 
Norberto's parental rights on the basis of the published notice to Norberto 
described above, Emily's affidavit in which she claimed not to know how to contact 
Norberto, her relinquishment and the relinquishment of Larry, Emily's legal 
husband. 
56. During the six and one-half months from the child's birth on 
September 1, 1999, to Emily's departure on March 21, 2000, Norberto purchased 
all of the durable goods necessary for the child's care, including a crib, stroller and 
car seat; he purchased clothes for the child; he purchased most of the formula for 
the child as he purchased a significant quantity, sufficient to meet the child's needs 
even when Norberto and Emily were living apart. 
57. During that six months, Norberto paid almost all of the financial 
support of the child, providing for his food, clothing and shelter while the child and 
Emily lived with him, and even giving Emily money for support of the child during 
some of the times that Emily lived apart from Norberto. 
58. During that six months no one else provided significant financial 
support for the child. 
59. During that six months Norberto maintained a meaningful, ongoing 
relationship with the child, providing actual physical care for the child during the 
times that Emily resided with Norberto and visiting and having regular 
communication with the child and Emily when she was living apart from Norberto. 
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60. During that six months Norberto demonstrated a full commitment to 
the responsibilities of parenthood as he obtained full-time employment, something 
he previously had not had, and he purchased food and clothing for the child and he 
arranged for permanent, adequate housing for Emily and the child. 
61. During that six months Norberto developed a substantial relationship 
with the child, a relationship which Emily abruptly cut off when she flew, without 
any prior warning whatsoever, to place the child for adoption. 
62. Emily actually resided with the child with Norberto for 
approximately three or more of the six months from the child's birth until Emily's 
departure. She moved in and out several times so it is difficult to determine just 
how much she actually lived with him, though it was a significant, on-going 
relationship. 
63. For the times when she did not actually reside with Norberto, he still 
maintained an ongoing relationship with the child and provided essentially all of his 
financial support. 
64. All of these facts support the conclusion that Norberto made 
substantial, meaningful efforts to fulfill his parental role as the father of the child. 
He was frustrated in this effort by Emily's departure to Utah to place the child for 
adoption. 
65. Norberto had no basis to know, when he returned from work on 
March 21, 2000, that Emily had gone to Utah to place the child for adoption. 
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ANALYSIS AND RULING 
In this matter Norberto has complained against the Adoption Center of 
Choice, asserting that it caused his parental rights to be terminated without notice 
to him. He now seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring the adoptive parents to 
present the child here in court to respond to his claim of parental right to the child 
and he seeks a writ of mandamus, compelling the Adoption Center of Choice to 
provide identifying information of the adoptive parents so that they may be served 
with the writ of habeas corpus. I now issue this ruling granting the issuance of each 
writ. 
Norberto's parental rights were not properly terminated. 
1. Norberto's consent to adoption was required, 
Utah Code Ann, § 78-30-4.14(l)(f) provides that an unmarried biological 
father of a child must relinquish his child for adoption or consent to the adoption of 
his child "only if the requirements of Subsection (2)(a) or (b) have been proven.7' 
Subsection (2)(b) does not apply as it governs cases where the child to be 
adopted is under six months of age. Here the child was more than six months of 
age at the time it was placed for adoption by Emily. 
Subsection (2)(a) governs those situations in which the child to be adopted 
is more than six months of age and thus controls. It provides: 
(2) In accordance with Subsection (1), the consent of an unmarried 
biological father is necessary only if the father has strictly complied with the 
requirements of this section. 
(a) (i) With regard to a child who is placed with adoptive parents 
more than six months after birth, an unmarried biological father shall 
have developed a substantial relationship with the child, taken some 
11 
measure of responsibility for the child and the child's future, and 
demonstrated a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood 
by financial support of the child, of a fair and reasonable sum and in 
accordance with the father's ability, when not prevented from doing 
so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the 
child, and either: 
(A) visiting the child at least monthly when physically and 
financially able to do so, and when not prevented from doing 
so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody 
of the child; or 
(B) regular communication with the child or with the person 
or agency having the care or custody of the child, when 
physically and financially unable to visit the child, and when 
not prevented from doing so by the person or authorized 
agency having lawful custody of the child. 
(ii) The subjective intent of an unmarried biological father, whether 
expressed or otherwise, unsupported by evidence of acts specified in 
this subsection shall not preclude a determination that the father 
failed to meet the requirements of this subsection, 
(iii) An unmarried biological father who openly lived with the child 
for a period of six months within the one-year period after the birth 
of the child and immediately preceding placement of the child with 
adoptive parents, and openly held himself out to be the father of the 
child during that period, shall be deemed to have developed a 
substantial relationship with the child and to have otherwise met the 
requirements of this subsection. 
This is a restrictive statute. Its purpose is to ensure that only unmarried 
biological fathers who have both supported the child and maintained meaningful 
parental contact with the child need consent to an adoption. Relinquishment or 
consent is not required from unmarried biological fathers who do not meet these 
requirements. 
In this case, the factual findings above support the conclusion that Norberto 
met all of the requirements of Subsection (2)(a). The child lived with him for much 
of the time from birth on September 1, 1999, to the mother's disappearance on 
March 21, 2000. During all of the time that the child actually lived with him, 
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Norberto provided all of the support as Emily did not work while she was residing 
with Norberto. There is no question that Norberto took substantial and meaningful 
steps to provide for the child's needs. Only Norberto bought the child's car seat, 
stroller and crib. Norberto bought most of the child's food for the six months 
before the child and mother disappeared. During the time the child lived with 
Norberto, he lived in a trailer owned by Norberto's grandfather, but provided to the 
couple by Norberto's arrangement with his grandfather. 
Norberto also visited with and actually cared for the child as much as the 
mother would allow. Consistent with the provisions of subparts (A) and (B), the 
only times when Norberto may not have actually visited with the child for more 
than a month were periods when the mother was not allowing him visitation. 
I find that Norberto complied with all of the requirements of Subsection 
(2)(a) and thus, his consent or relinquishment were required before the child could 
be placed for adoption. 
2. Norberto did not give actual consent to the adoption. 
The court file in case number 002400120, the termination file, clearly 
reflects that Norberto did not give consent to the adoption. 
3. Norberto did not receive either actual or constructive notice of the 
termination proceedings. 
In this case Norberto's parental rights were terminated by an order of the 
court in the termination proceedings. The termination proceedings were 
commenced when the Adoption Center of Choice filed a petition to terminate the 
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parental rights. That same day the order was issued. I find the procedure to be 
inadequate. 
Once a legal proceeding is commenced, the proper way to notify other 
parties of the existence of the action is by the service of a summons in accordance 
with Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Pvule 4 contemplates personal service 
as the standard, but then, also allows a court, in appropriate cases, to authorize 
service by publication. Rule 4(g) provides: 
(g) Other service. Where the identity or whereabouts of the person 
to be served are unknown and cannot be ascertained through reasonable 
diligence . . . the party seeking service of process may file a motion 
supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing service by publication, 
by mail, or by some other means. The supporting affidavit shall set forth the 
efforts made to identify, locate or serve the party to be served, or the 
circumstances which make it impracticable to serve all of the individual 
parties. If the motion is granted, the court shall order service of process by 
publication. .. provided that the means of notice employed shall be 
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested 
parties of the pendency of the action to the extent reasonably possible or 
practicable. The court's order shall also specify the content of the process to 
be served and the event or events as of which service shall be deemed 
complete. A copy of the court's order shall be served upon the defendant 
with the process specified by the court. 
This rule, allowing service by publication, contemplates that the court 
approve in advance, pursuant to motion, the request for service by publication. 
Contrary to that, in this case the petition for termination and the order each were 
filed the same day. The petition was accompanied with service by publication of a 
notice as a fait accompli. That is patently improper. There is no court order 
approving the necessity for service by publication. 
Equally telling, Emily's affidavit, which is the only affidavit supporting the 
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claim that Norberto could not be found, was false in critical particulars. She knew 
where he lived at the time that she left, for she left his house to get on the plane to 
Utah. She knew that his house was directly behind his grandfather's who likely 
would know where he had moved to, if in fact he moved as she told the adoption 
agency. I find the affidavit to be false, and thus not a proper basis for a claim of 
necessity for service by publication. 
Finally, and most importantly, the notice published in the Alabama 
Messenger was woefully insufficient. It did not contain a case number in which an 
objection to the petition for termination could be filed, as the petition had not been 
filed, it referred to a procedure under Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.7, though that 
section was repealed in 1995. It did not accurately identify the child, though his 
true and correct legal name was known to the adoption agency. It did not even 
accurately identify the mother, as it left off her last name.3 Simply put, the notice 
did not provide meaningful notice to the unmarried biological father. 
What is most strange is that this court was involved in the first place. Both 
of the biological parents resided in Alabama and the prospective adoptive parents 
resided in Washington. Why a Utah court was needed in this instance is beyond 
me. The adoption agency could have made certain that the mother's consent 
complied with Washington law, as the adoption was to be finalized there, and it 
could have used Washington law to deal with the unmarried biological father. 
3
 These failures are so pervasive that I question the good faith of the agency. Were these errors 
deliberate? Did the agency intentionally obfuscate so that Norberto, the unmarried biological father, 
would not actually find out that Emily was participating in termination proceedings in Utah? 
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Instead, it filed a petition and persuaded a Utah judge to terminate the parental 
rights of an unmarried biological father without complying with the requirements of 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure concerning service and it provided clearly 
misleading and unhelpful information in the notice published in the Alabama 
Messenger. Simply put, Norberto did not receive either actual or constructive 
notice of the proceedings in Utah to terminate his parental rights. 
Norberto is entitled to the requested writs. 
The parental right is an important, constitutionally protected liberty interest. 
As such, it cannot be cut off without due process. See In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 
1372-73 (Utah 1982); Troxelv. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2059-61 (2000). In 
this case, the due process violations were extreme. 
The file in the termination proceeding makes clear Norberto did not receive 
actual notice of the termination proceedings, no summons or other process was 
served upon him, and the published notice was abysmally inadequate. As a result, 
there is a substantial likelihood that the attempt by the Utah court to terminate 
Norberto's parental rights will fail for lack of due process 
While the termination proceeding provides no information as to the identity 
of the Washington adoptive parents, that information is known to the Adoption 
Center of Choice. At the hearing the Adoption Center's prior social worker 
testified that the Washington adoptive parents were informed that this was a "high 
risk" adoption as the agency did not have a relinquishment or consent from the 
unmarried biological father. Further, I inquired of the social worker and was 
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informed that the Washington adoptive parents, though not parties to this action (at 
least not yet), have been apprised of this proceeding. Where, as here, the adoptive 
parents are aware of this proceeding and were aware at the time that the adoption 
was a "high risk" adoption, and because the adoptive parents entered into what is 
commonly called an open adoption, with full disclosure to the birth mother of their 
identities, no great prejudice will come to the adoptive parents if their identity is 
disclosed.4 Further, given the likelihood that Norberto will prevail in an attack on 
the termination proceedings, it is appropriate that a writ of mandamus issue 
compelling the Adoption Center of Choice to provide identifying information to 
Norberto so that he may serve appropriate process on the adoptive parents. 
Curiously, the Washington adoptive parents came to Utah to pick up the 
child. By purposefully availing themselves of the laws of the State of Utah and by 
coming to Utah to take physical custody of the child for adoption, the Washington 
adoptive parents have come within the jurisdiction of the Utah courts. As a result, 
this court has jurisdiction over the adoptive parents to compel their return, with the 
child, to Utah to respond to the father's claim of parenthood. 
The father has commenced paternity proceedings in Alabama. Given the 
unequivocal testimony of Emily that Norberto is the father of the child, it is likely 
Norberto will prevail in his paternity proceedings in Alabama. Further, given the 
4
 At the hearing it became clear that Norberto's counsel knows at least the names of the 
adoptive parents. The adoption was an open adoption and Emily knew the names of and met with the 
adoptive parents before relinquishing her child. Prior to the hearing in this case Emily disclosed the 
names of the adoptive parents to Norberto's counsel. The writ is nonetheless appropriate as Norberto's 
counsel must have sufBcient information to find and serve the adoptive parents with necessaiy process to 
bring all of these issues to resolution. 
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flaws in the termination proceedings here in Utah, it is likely Norberto will prevail in 
his claim to set aside the termination proceedings As he has a substantial 
likelihood of prevailing in his claims, it is appropriate that the adoptive parents, who 
availed themselves of the benefit of the laws of Utah and who came here to take 
physical custody of the child, should be compelled to present the child before the 
Utah court for the purpose of complying with the reasonable requests of this court 
or of the Alabama court in proceedings to determine paternity and to determine 
whether the father's termination was proper 
Plaintiffs requests for entry of a writ of mandamus and a writ of habeas 
corpus each are granted Plaintiffs counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate 
order and the writs 
Dated this _/_ day of November, 2000 
BY THE COURT. 
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